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Prof JA Robinson  
  
1  INTRODUCTION  
It is a truism that both the history of a country and its peoples and the dispensation the 
country aspires to be, is to some degree reflected in its Constitution. South Africa is 
certainly no exception. The constitutional dispensation that came into effect in South 
Africa on the 27th April 1994 was designed to innovate social, political and legal 
structures that would be radically different from those of the country's past history.
1
 The 
Constitution not only recognises the injustices of the past, but also depicts the new 
South Africa as an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.
2
 To this end the constitutional Bill of Rights provides the legally enforceable 
backing. In the new dispensation any institution associated with the discrimination and 
repression practices of apartheid South Africa is  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*  This contribution will also be published in the series Forum Juris Internationalis presented by the   Faculty of 
Law, Justus Liebig Universität, Gießen, Germany.  
1     The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (hereafter referred to as the Interim Constitution) 
came into force on the 27th April 1994.  It effected radical changes in the sense that henceforth the franchise and 
associated political and civil rights would be accorded to all citizens without racial qualification and the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty was now replaced by the doctrine of constitutional supremacy. The Interim Constitution 
was formally adopted as an Act of the pre-democratic Tricameral Parliament and was only meant to be a 
transitional Constitution. One of its principal purposes was to set out the procedures for the negotiation and 
drafting of a final Constitution. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 (hereafter referred to 
as the Constitution) completes the negotiated revolution. The Constitution was drafted and adopted by an elected 
Constitutional Assembly which had been given two years to produce a constitution that conformed to 34 
constitutional principles that had been agreed upon during the pre-1993 political negotiations. In Ex parte 
Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
1996 (First Certification  judgment)  1996 4 SA 744 (CC) the Constitutional Court refused to certify that the 
Constitution conformed to the said principles and it was only in the so-called Second Certification judgment 1997 
2 SA 97 (CC) that the Constitutional Court was prepared to find that the text was consistent with the constitutional 
principles. The Constitution was signed into law by President Nelson Mandela at Sharpeville on 4 February 1997. 
See De Waal, Currie & Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook (4th ed) ch 1 (hereafter referred to as De Waal et 
al). 
2  In the preamble to the Constitution it is specifically stated that the injustices of the country’s past are recognised 
and that the Constitution is adopted as the supreme law of the country so as to heal the divisions of the past and 
to establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.  
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incompatible with the values embodied in the kind of society the country now aspires to 
be.
3 
 
Institutionalised discrimination constituted a major characteristic of the political history of 
South Africa. It may perhaps even have been the most decisive impetus for the 
country's radical transformation. The principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination 
has consequently been afforded a special place in the Constitution. Racial 
discrimination and sex discrimination, as well as other inequalities, were inscribed in the 
social fabric of apartheid South Africa. Children too, were in many respects defenceless 
victims of such discriminatory practices. The degradation imposed upon, and profound 
humiliation suffered by, children’s parents under the apartheid system, had a severe 
impact on them. Small wonder then that the principle of equal treatment and non-
discrimination has been afforded special importance in the Constitution.  
The transformation effected by the constitutional dispensation was radical. In fact, 
eminent scholars from the United States convey that South Africa is increasingly 
establishing itself at the centre of a transnational exchange of ideas about the rule of 
law and human rights, and that human rights scholars around the world can ill afford not 
to pay attention to the developments in the country.
4
 In this regard reference is made to 
the fact, inter alia, that South Africa is the first state to expressly prohibit discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation in its Constitution.
5
 This development caused 
normative ripple effects around the globe.   
3  Van der Vyver ‘Constitutional Protection of Children and Young Persons’ in Robinson The Law of Children and 
Young Persons in South Africa 267 (hereafter referred to as Van der Vyver).  
4  Scott & Alston ‘Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s 
Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise’ in 2000 South African Journal of Human Rights 211.  
5      S 9 of the Constitution expressly forbids unfair discrimination, directly or indirectly, on, inter alia, sexual 
orientation and sex. Without entering into debate on this issue, it may be noted, though, that the status of same-
sex relationships is currently a hotly debated issue in South Africa. See Langemaat v Minister of Safety and 
Security 1992 2 All SA 259 (T); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 1999 
3 SA 173(C) ; Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development and Others (Lesbian and Gay Equality 
Project as Amicus Curiae) 2003 2 SA 198 (CC). In a yet unreported case, J&B v Director General: Department 
of Home Affairs,  
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In order to fathom the impact of the Constitution upon the rights of children, a general 
overview of constitutional principles and provisions necessary for the comprehension of 
the rights of children in the Constitution will be given. Thereafter the rights of children 
expressly mentioned in the Constitution will be addressed. The equal protection and 
non-discrimination provisions will also be addressed, albeit only indirectly.  
 
2  CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN  
2.1 The application of the Constitution  
From the provisions of section 8(1) it is clear that the Bill of Rights, true to nature, binds 
all organs of state. The sub-section reads that the Bill ‘applies to all law, and binds the 
legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.’ As this provision is self-
explanatory, no further attention will be paid to it except to indicate, however, that ‘law’ 
in these sections is translated in the Afrikaans version of the Constitution as 
‘regsvoorskrif’ (‘Rechtsvorschrift’). What is designated by this provision, therefore, is 
that ‘law’ means positive law which includes statutory law, common law and customary 
law in contradistinction to where law is translated as ‘wet’ (‘Gesetz’).
6 
 
Sections 8(2) and (3) provide for the application of the Bill also in private law matters. 
As such, the phraseology in which the horizontal application of provisions of the Bill is 
couched, is juxtaposed with the developmental function of the court in respect of the 
common law. Section 8(2) and (3) provides as follows in this regard:  
 
 
 
  Constitutional Case No 46/02 decided on 28 March 2003, the Constitutional Court held that comprehensive 
legislation regularising relationships between gay and lesbian persons is necessary since it is unsatisfactory for 
courts to grant piecemeal relief to the gay and lesbian community as and when aspects of their relationships are 
found to be prejudiced by unconstitutional legislation. Contrary to the position in Germany where the argument 
revolved around the provisions of art 6 I of the Grundgesetz which protect marriage qua institution when the 
constitutionality of the Gesetz zur Beendigung der Diskriminierung gleichgeschlechtlicher 
Gemeinschaften:Lebenspartnerschaften of 16 February 2002 was at issue, the debate in South Africa focuses 
on the provisions of s 9 of the Constitution which prohibits unfair discrimination. For further discussion of the 
relevance of same-sex relationships to the rights of children, see text accompanying n 65 infra. Van der Vyver 
(n 3)  268 n 23.  
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(2)   A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of 
any duty imposed by the right.  
(3)   When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in 
terms of subsection (2), a court –  
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the 
common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and  
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is 
in accordance with section 36(1).  
 
From the outset above, it is clear that in contradistinction to section 8(1), natural and 
juristic persons are only bound by the Bill of Rights to the extent that a provision of the 
Bill is applicable in view of the nature of the right and the duty imposed. Questions 
concerning the horizontal application of the Bill can therefore not be determined a priori 
and in the abstract.
7
 In fact, from the very wording of section 8(3) it appears that 
whether a provision of the Bill applies horizontally, will depend on the nature of the 
private conduct in question and the circumstances of the particular case. The extent to 
which a provision is applicable can only be determined by reference to the context 
within which it is sought to be relied upon.
8
 If, however, the provisions of section 8(2) do 
find application, the duty to uphold, endure or execute the right  
7     De Waal et al (n 1) 55.  
8   ibid. De Waal et al provide the following examples to illustrate the argument: The right of every  arrested person to 
be informed promptly of the right to remain silent is of a nature that makes it generally inapplicable to private 
arrests. There is, however, no reason why a private security officer who knows of this constitutional right, should 
not observe it.  Conversely, the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed generally applies on the horizontal 
level.  The right to assemble in, for example, shopping malls and on the property of an employer is therefore 
guaranteed. But in some circumstances it may be inappropriate to apply the right horizontally.  For example, it is 
unlikely that the right to assemble can be relied on to justify demonstrations in, or in front of, someone's private 
home.  
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vests in a natural or juristic person similarly than is the position with regard to organs 
within the State structure as set out in section 8(1).
9 
 
The purpose of a provision is an important consideration to determine whether it is 
applicable to private conduct or not.
10 
By the same token, the nature of any duty 
imposed by the right must also be taken into account. Private or juristic persons are 
often driven primarily by a concern for themselves while the State, on the other hand, 
should rather be motivated by a concern for the well-being of society as a whole. The 
application of the Bill should therefore not undermine private autonomy to the same 
extent that it places restrictions on the sovereignty of parliament.
1112 
 
Section 8(2) applies to all instances where the regulatory law, which either affords 
legality to the decision taken or act performed, or which prohibits such conduct through 
private law proscriptions or sanctions, is part of the common law. A court is therefore 
charged with the obligation of considering the permissive or proscriptive rule applicable 
to conduct of the duty-bound person with two primary questions in mind:  
• does the concerned rule of the common law in any way frustrate the 
constitutionally protected right implicated by the decision or act of the duty bound 
subject?  
• does the concerned rule of the common law permit limitations of the 
constitutionally protected right which do not comply with the demands of the limitations 
provision of the Constitution?  
 
If the answer to either of these questions is in the affirmative, a court will be under an 
obligation to ‘develop’ the common law in order to give effect to the  
 
 
 
9    Van der Vyver (n 3) 270.  
10   De Waal et al (n 1) 56.  
11   ibid.  
12   It would appear that in the following   instances there will be no Drittwirkung: situations with regard to  
citizenship rights; the right to just administrative action; the rights of detained, arrested and accused persons 
generally.  In the following instances it can be said that the nature of duties imposed by the right to have 
legislative and other measures taken would (normally) result in them not being applicable to private conduct: the 
rights to protect the environment, the right to housing, the right to health care, food, water and social security, 
and to education.  
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constitutionally protected right and/or to bring the limitation of that right as sanctioned by 
the common law in conformity with the limitation demands of the Constitution.
13
  It is 
also clear that development of the common law in terms of section 8(2) entitles a court 
to read constitutional rights into the common law which the common law would 
otherwise not have protected. It may also rewrite common law limitations pertaining to a 
particular right which  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  The form of application in s 8(2) reflects the so-called indirect application of the Bill of Rights. In this instance a 
dispute is resolved by interpreting a statute or developing the common law so as to promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill  through the operation of ordinary law. When the Bill  is directly applied, however, the 
question is whether there is any inconsistency between the Bill  and the law or conduct in question. If so, such 
law or conduct  unjustifiably violates the Bill  and a remedy provided for by the Constitution will be given to the 
applicant. See De Waal et al (n 1) 167. Remedies flowing from a direct application of the Bill to law and conduct 
are provided for by sections 38, 172(1), 8(3) and 39(2). These sections provide as follows: S 38: Anyone listed 
in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been 
infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. S 172(1): 
When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court –  
  (a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its 
inconsistency; and  
       (b) may make an order that is just and equitable, including –  
       (i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and  
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to allow the competent 
authority to correct the defect.  
 
  S 8(3) has been referred to supra.  
S 39(2) provides as follows: When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
Prima facie there appears to be an overlap between the provisions of ss 39(2) and 8(3).  On closer scrutiny,  
however, it is clear that there is a marked difference in the sense that s 8(3) establishes a law creating power, 
whereas the competence vested in a court by s 39(2) in regard to the common law is one of applying its normal 
power of interpretation in favorum libertatis with the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution as a 
substantive directive. Van der Vyver (n 3) 274. Van der Vyver warns, though,  that the distinction between law 
creation in terms of s 8(3) and development through interpretation pursuant to s 39(2) is difficult to define with 
any degree of precision. The language of s 8(3) indicates the power of the court to add to the common law 
provisions that would afford protection of constitutionally defined rights which the common law as such would 
otherwise not have provided. It furthermore adds to the common law limitations of constitutionally protected 
rights in their application to natural and juristic persons which will conform with the limitation provisions of the 
Constitution in all instances where the common law confinement of such rights falls short of the constitutional 
limitation conditions and requirements.  The provisions of s 172(2)(a) of the Constitution should also be borne in 
mind. This section provides that the Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or a court of similar status may 
make an order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament. However, such an order will have 
no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court.  
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is now also protected by the Constitution so as to equate those limitations with the 
constitutional conditions for, and requirements of, such limitations.
14 
 
2.2  The limitation of constitutionally protected rights  
Section 36(2) provides that limitation of a constitutionally protected right must comply 
with the prescriptions of section 36(1) or with the dictates of any other provision of the 
Constitution. In terms of section 36(1) the limitation of a constitutionally protected right 
must adhere to the following requirements:  
• the limitation must be sanctioned by law of general application;  
• the limitation must be reasonable;  
• the limitation must be justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom taking into account all relevant factors, including 
the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, the nature and 
extent of the limitation, the relation between the limitation and its purpose, and also less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
  
It is to be noted that ‘law of general application’ reflects a broad definition of law, 
including limitations sanctioned by statutory provisions and the common law.
15
 The 
requirement of reasonableness was held to mean that a law or action limiting a right 
must have a reasonable goal and also that the means for achieving that goal must be 
reasonable.
16
 However, in S v Makwanyane and  
 
 
 
 
 
 
14   Van der Vyver (n 3) 271. Van der Vyver points out that courts are given law-creating powers which by 
       far exceed those exercised previously by the High Court in respect of the common law.  The fact that 
implementation of s 8(3) powers amounts to the courts’ usurping the function of the legislature and as such 
violates the separation of powers which constitutes a salient component of the new constitutional dispensation, 
is, however, of no relevance after the decision of the Constitutional Court in In re Certification of the Amended 
text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1997 1 BCLR 1 (CC) (see n 1 supra.). Having 
endorsed the revised Constitution, the Constitutional Court afforded incontestable sanction to these powers. It is 
furthermore important to note that whereas in the past principles of natural justice served as criterion of the 
judicial developmental function, the courts must now look to the Constitution to find the norm of rights protection, 
and of the limitation of rights that must be incorporated into the common law.  
15   Van der Vyver (n 3) 277.  
16   See Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1995 4 SA 631 (CC).  
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Another
17 
the Constitutional Court sounded a more cautious approach to this 
requirement.  
The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a 
democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an 
assessment based on proportionality. … The fact that different rights have different 
implications for democracy and, in the case of our Constitution, for ‘an open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality’, means that there is no absolute 
standard which can be laid down for determining reasonableness and necessity. 
Principles can be established, but the application of those principles to particular 
circumstances can only be done on a case-by-case basis. This is inherent in the 
requirement of proportionality, which calls for the balancing of different interests. In the 
balancing process the relevant considerations will include the nature of the right that is 
limited and its importance to an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose to 
such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy and, particularly where the 
limitation has to be necessary, whether the desired ends could reasonably be achieved 
through other means less damaging to the right in question.  In the process regard must 
be had to the provisions of section 33 and the underlying values of the Constitution, 
bearing in mind that, … the role of the court is not to second-guess the wisdom of policy 
choices made by legislators.
18 
 
17   1995 3 SA 391 (CC) at par 104.  
18   Van der Vyver (n 3) 279 submits that a useful guide to establish whether the classification of persons for 
purposes of the limitation of a fundamental right is reasonably permissible, would be to consider the legality 
requirements of this section in view of the prescriptions of the non-discrimination clause in s 9 of the 
Constitution.  All classifications founded on, inter alia, race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth are rendered suspect by s 9. 
Note that s 33 as it has been referred to in casu has been replaced by s 36 of the Constitution. See too n 93 
infra.  
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This cautious approach was echoed afterwards in a number of decisions. In S v 
Manamela
19 
the court explained that it has to engage in a balancing exercise and arrive 
at a global judgment on proportionality and not adhere mechanically to a sequential 
checklist.  As a general rule, the more serious the impact of the measure on the right, 
the more persuasive or compelling the justification must be. Ultimately the question is 
one of degree to be assessed in the concrete legislative and social setting of the 
measure paying due regard to the means which are realistically available in the country, 
but without losing sight of the ultimate values to be protected.
20 
 
The further qualification that limitations of a fundamental right must be justifiable in an 
open and democratic society clearly envisages a society that differs fundamentally from 
the one associated with apartheid South Africa.  In fact, the true nature of this 
requirement only comes to the fore when cognisance is taken of the provisions of 
section 7(1), which in essence elevate the democratic values of human dignity, equality 
and freedom to the status of being the ultimate normative sources of the rights 
enshrined in the Bill; and of section 39(1) which compels a court to promote the values 
that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom when interpreting the Bill.
21 
 
2.4  The constitutional Grundnorm  
The constitutional Grundnorm of South Africa is a product of the country's past history. 
The basic norm, which in the case of a discrepancy between  
 
 
 
 
19   2000 3 SA 1 (CC). 20 See too Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA  
      757 (CC) par 29 – 35.   
21  In Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1995 4 SA 631 (CC) the Constitutional Court held that 
‘[w]e need to locate ourselves in the mainstream of international practice’ to establish what is meant by this 
requirement. It is furthermore illuminating to bear the Preamble of the Constitution in mind. Specific reference is 
made to the motivation for the Constitution qua supreme law of the country to achieve the following:  
• Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights;  
• Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the 
people and every citizen is equally protected by law;  
• Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and  
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different constitutional interests will override any other constitutional provision that 
comes into conflict with it, is constituted by the equal protection and nondiscrimination 
provisions in the Constitution. The provision that South Africa is to be an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, makes it clear that in 
the case of a conflict of constitutional interests, human dignity and equality will be the 
primary consideration.
22 
 
The provisions with regard to equal protection and non-discrimination are found in 
section 9 of the Constitution. Amongst others, it prohibits unfair discrimination on 
grounds of race, gender, sex, pregnancy, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. The legislator is also tasked to enact 
national legislation to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. Discrimination on one or 
more of the grounds set out above will be considered unfair unless it is established that 
the discrimination is fair.  
In this paragraph brief attention will be paid to age as a ground on which discrimination 
is forbidden. Broadly speaking, it would appear that the legal position reflects a 
teleological approach - the purpose of differentiating between categories must dictate 
the ethical propriety of the basis employed to differentiate between them. In other 
words, the basis of the classification of groups of persons for the purpose of 
differentiating in law between these categories must be truly relevant with a view to the 
legal purpose to be served by the classification.
23
  Equal protection, therefore, does not 
mean per se actual equality in the arithmetical sense that would negate all 
differentiation between categories of people. If the classification is founded on a 
reasonable basis, and it is truly relevant to the purpose it is meant to serve, 
classification and differentiation for purposes of law may well fall within a definition of 
equal  
 
 
 
 
•      Build a united and democratic South Africa to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family  
      of nations. 
22   See S v Makwanyane (supra text accompanying n 19); Van der Vyver (n 3) 283.  
23   Van der Vyver (n 3) 289.  
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treatment. Of course, practicality and legal certainty must also prevail. Legal certainty 
dictates that the law operates with fixed age criteria.
24 
 
 
In South African law majority is attained at the age of 21. Puberty is reached by girls of 
12 and boys of 14 years of age. Boys younger than 18 and girls younger than 15 years 
of age need ministerial consent to marry.  Persons of 16 years are competent to make a 
will.  Below seven years, a child is considered to be doli et culpae incapax and unable to 
enter into agreements. It is perfectly acceptable that specific age limits are set for the 
sake of legal certainty, provided of course, that the designated age should not be 
entirely arbitrary but derive from existing knowledge of human development.
25 
 
 
3.  RIGHTS OF EVERYONE WITH SPECIFIC RELEVANCE TO CHILDREN  
3.1  Introduction  
The Constitution recognises that children are particularly vulnerable to violations of their 
rights and that they have specific and unique interests.  
 
 
 
 
 
24  Dicta in the English case of Gillick v West Norfolk Area Health Authority 1985 3 All ER 402 and provisions of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child  (1989) deviate to some extent from a rigid interpretation of legal certainty. 
In Gillick, two passages make it clear that, at least within the parent-child relationship, the development of the 
child must be taken into account.  Lord Fraser of Tullybelton held that parental rights to control a child do not 
exist for the benefit of the parent, but for that of the child, and that such rights are justified only in so far as they 
enable the parent to perform his or her duties towards the child and other children in the family.  With respect to 
the evolving capacities of the child, Lord Scarman explained that parental rights must yield to the child's right to 
make his or her own decisions when the child reaches a sufficient understanding and intelligence to be capable 
of making up his or her own mind on the matter requiring decision. The principle of law , … is that parental rights 
are derived from parental duty and exist only so long as they are needed for the protection of the person and 
property of the child. The principle has been subjected to certain age limits set by statute for certain purposes; 
and in some cases the courts have declared an age of discretion at which a child acquires before the age of 
majority the right to make his own decision. See in this regard too references to Grundrechtsmündigkeit in 
German literature, inter alia the discussion in Maunz-Dürig-Herzog Grundgesetzkommentar at art 6GG.  
25   It is clear that differentiation between the ages of reaching puberty by boys and girls reflects the difference in 
physiological development between the sexes. As such the legal prescriptions appear to be constitutionally in 
order.  However, if one were to apply puberty for purposes of establishing accountability in private law, it would 
surely not stand constitutional muster. It is also suggested that the legislator should consider substituting 18 for 
21 years as the age of majority in view of the improvement of educational standards, access to secondary 
education, the exposure of young people to information and to influences that contribute to their early maturity. 
See Van der Vyver (n 3) 294.  
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Provision is made in section 28, therefore,  for the protection of specific rights of 
children. However, they are also entitled as ordinary inhabitants of the country to the 
protection afforded by the Constitution.  Children are entitled not only to the rights 
contained in section 28, but also to all other rights in the Bill pertaining to them. In this 
regard the right to equality, the right to education and the right to personal autonomy 
constructed from the rights to privacy, freedom of religion, freedom of expression and 
freedom of association read together, are the most important.
26  
 
3.2 The right to education  
African children were subjected to inferior education in the pre-1994 public school 
system.
27 
In fact, all school going children of colour fell victim to an unequal and racially 
defined distribution of resources.
28
 The challenge under the new constitutional 
dispensation, therefore, is to create an education system that will ensure that the human 
resources and potential of our society are developed to the full – education does not 
take place in a vacuum; it is  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26   In view of the fact that the provisions of s 9 regarding equality have been dealt with supra, no specific attention 
will further be paid to this aspect. Reference should, for the sake of interest be made,  however, to the 
unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals in Mthembu v Letsela and Another SCA 71/1998 on 30 
May 2000 (unreported) where the extra-marital daughter of a Black man who died intestate challenged the 
validity of the customary law rule of primogeniture in intestate succession inter alia on the basis that it 
discriminated unfairly against her on the basis of her sex and gender. The court rejected this argument on the 
basis that the distinction that excluded her from inheritance was her extra-marital status rather than her sex or 
gender. Regrettably the court failed to establish whether the rule discriminated unfairly on the basis of extra-
marital status. See too Bekink & Brand ‘Constitutional Protection of Children’ in Davel Introduction to Child Law 
in South Africa 179.  
27   See Maithufi ‘Children, Young Persons and School Law’ in Robinson The Law of Children and Young Persons in 
South Africa 238. The inequality inherent in education was born out by the Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953. Dr 
Verwoerd, probably the most prominent architect of apartheid, described its purposes as follows: Racial 
relations cannot improve if the wrong type of education is given to natives. They cannot improve if the result of 
native education is the creation of frustrated people who, as a result of the education they received, have 
expectation in life which circumstances in South Africa do not allow to be fulfilled immediately, when it creates 
people who are trained for professions not open to them, when there are people who have received a form of 
cultural training which strengthens their desire for the white-collar occupations to such an extent that there are 
more such people than openings available. See House of Assembly Debates of 17 September 1953 col 3576  
28  Van der Vyver (n 3) 266 conveys that in 1982/1983 the per capita expenditure on education was R13850 for 
Whites, R593 for Coloureds, R871 for Indians and R192 for Africans. In the same fiscal year the teacher/pupil 
ratio was 1:18 in the case of White  
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inextricably intertwined with the socio-economic, cultural and political character of the 
community it serves.  
The Constitution guarantees to everyone the right:  
• to basic education, including adult basic education, and to further education;
29 
 
• to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice;
30 
and  
• to establish and to maintain independent educational institutions.
31 
 
 
The wording of section 29 makes it clear that everyone, therefore also children, have an 
immediately enforceable right to basic education, but that  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
schools, 1:26 in the case of Coloured schools, 1:23 in the case of Indian schools and 1:42 in the case  of 
schools for African children.  
29    S 29(1). This section reads as follows: Everyone has the right  
        (a) to a basic education, including adult basic education; and  
        (b) to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively    
             available and accessible.  
30  S 29(2) provides that: Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their 
choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the 
effective access to, and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable educational 
alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking into account – (a) equity;  
        (b) practicabilty; and  
        (c) the need to redress the results of the past racially discriminatory laws and practices. 
31  S 29(3).  This section reads that: Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, 
independent educational institutions that –  
  (a) do not discriminate on the basis of race;  
       (b) are registered with the state; and  
       (c) maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at comparable public educational institutions. In In re: 
The School Education Bill of 1995 (Gauteng) 1996 4 BCLR 536 (CC) the constitutionality of sections of the 
South African Schools Act 27 of 1966 implicating the future of Afrikaans schools and Christian education was 
contested.  The Constitutional Court upheld their constitutionality.  
  [i]mense inequality continues to exist in relation to access to education in our country. At present, the 
imperatives of equalising access to education are strong, and even although these should not go to the extent of 
overriding constitutionally protected rights in relation to language and culture, they do represent an important 
element in the equation. The theme of reducing the discrepancies in the life chances of all South Africans runs 
right through the  
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the right to further education is of a rather qualified nature in the sense that the right to 
such education is couched in the language of progressive implementation.  However, in 
both instances there is a primary duty on the State to provide the support, facilities and 
services for the realisation of these rights.
32 
The right to receive education in the official 
language of one's choice in public educational institutions too is of a qualified nature.  
This right recognises the importance of children receiving education in their mother 
tongue, but balances this imperative with requirements of practicality by providing that 
instruction in the official language of choice must only be provided where reasonably 
practicable. It is furthermore important to note that the right is not to mother tongue 
instruction, but only a right to instruction in the official language of one's choice.  
The right to establish and maintain independent educational institutions, which is also a 
qualified right, is in the ordinary course of events exercised by parents rather than 
children. It goes without saying, of course, that children are directly affected by the 
exercising of this right. In Ex parte Gauteng  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constitution, from the forceful opening words of the preamble to the reminder of the past … Van der   Vyver (n 
3) 311; Bekink & Brand (n 26) 179. S 239 of the Constitution provides that a public school is regarded as an 
organ of state because it exercises public power and performs public functions in terms of the legislation. Being 
an organ of state, a public school is in a position to violate rights and is therefore bound by the Bill in terms of s 
8(1). Public schools, qua organs of state, form part of the broader public education administration and must 
comply with constitutional prescriptions for regarding administration. Organs of state must be governed by 
democratic values enshrined in the Constitution, practice open, participative and accountable governance and, 
amongst others, be development-oriented and promote a high standard of professional ethics.  
  In the terms of s 5 of the South African Schools Act, a public school must admit learners and serve their 
educational requirements without unfairly discriminating in any way. It is an important function of the school 
governing body to determine an admission policy of the school but it may not administer any test related to such 
admission. In addition, no learner may be refused admission to a public school on the grounds that the parent: 
is unable to pay or has not paid school fees as determined by the governing body; does not subscribe to the 
mission statement of the school; or has refused to enter into a contract in which he or she waives any claims for 
damages arising out of the education of the learner. In terms of s 6, the school governing body of a public 
school may determine the language policy of the school but subject to norms and standards which the Minister 
may determine for public schools in this regard. The section makes it abundantly clear that no form of racial 
discrimination may be practiced in implementing a language policy. In line with the Constitution which 
recognises Sign Language as an official language of the country, a recognised Sign Language also has the 
status of an official language for the purposes of learning at a public school. See  
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Legislature: In re Gauteng School Education Bill
33 
the argument put before the court 
was that section 32 of the Interim Constitution placed a positive obligation on the State 
to establish, where practicable, educational institutions based on common culture, 
language or religion.  The Constitutional Court rejected this argument, holding that this 
section guarantees a freedom - a freedom to establish educational institutions based on 
a common culture, language or religion. A person can indeed invoke the protection of 
the court where that freedom is threatened, but the language of the section makes it 
clear that such educational institutions need not be established by the State.
34 
 
3.3  Personal autonomy  
Like everyone else, children are entitled to the right to privacy (section 14), the right to 
freedom of religion, belief and opinion (section 15), the right to  
 
 
 
too Bray ‘The South African Schools Act 84 of 1996’ in Davel Introduction to Child Law in South Africa 285 et 
seq.  
33   1996 3 SA 165 (CC).  The decision dealt with section 32(c) of the Interim Constitution which provided that every 
person shall have the right to establish, where practicable, education institutions based on common culture, 
language or religion provided, however, that there shall be no discrimination on the ground of race.  
34   On 173.  The court explains that the object of this subsection is to make clear that while every person has a right 
to basic education through instruction in the language of his or her choice, those persons who want more than 
that and wish to  have educational institutions based on a special culture, language or religion which is common, 
has the freedom to set up such institutions based on that commonality, unless it is not practicable. This 
viewpoint was echoed in Wittmann v Deutsche Schulverein, Pretoria 1998 4 SA 423 (T) where the mother of a 
child enrolled at a German school  objected to a requirement that the child attend academic religious-instruction 
classes. In essence her argument ran that this requirement violated her right to freedom of religion. The court 
held that this subsection guarantees the freedom of individuals to establish their own educational institutions 
based on their own values. The right to exclusivity on the grounds of culture, language or religion includes the 
right to exclude non-users of that language and non-adherents of that culture or religion, or to require conformity 
from them. It follows therefore, that this sub-section recognises the freedom to establish parochial educational 
institutions with confessional religious observances and instruction. Attendance at religious classes may indeed 
be made obligatory. The State is not constitutionally obliged to provide funding to these private institutions, but 
neither is there a constitutional provision to subsidisation.  It is clear, therefore, that the right to establish a 
private school based on a common culture, language or religion must by necessity include the right to exclude 
those who do not prescribe to the particular culture, language or religion. Freedom of religion as it relates to 
access to such independent educational institutions amounts to no more than the freedom of ‘nonjoinder.’ At 
454G-455B. See too Bekink & Brand (n 26) 180.  
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freedom of expression (section 16), and the right to freedom of association (section 
18).
35 
 
 
4 SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: SECTION 28  
4.1  Introduction  
With the exception of specific restrictions on their fundamental rights imposed by their 
youth (e.g. the right to vote is restricted to ‘every adult citizen’) every child enjoys the 
same protection in the Bill as his or her adult counterpart. The dictum of the United 
States Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v Danforth
36 
that constitutional rights do 
not mature and come into being magically once one attains the state-defined age of 
majority, also applies in South African law.
37
 Section 28 does not confer a right to 
individual self-determination on children.  When questions regarding the lifestyle of 
children, or religion, are addressed, a balance must be struck between their interests, 
and the interests of their parents and the State.  In such instances children must, like 
everyone else, derive their claims to personal autonomy and self-fulfilment from the 
right to privacy, and from the rights to freedom of religion, speech and association. The 
limitation of these rights becomes more difficult to justify as a child grows older, since 
the responsibilities of parents and the State towards a child are linked to the child's 
age.
38
 The interest of children in maintaining their own autonomy must therefore be 
seen in the context of the relationship of dependence that of necessity exists between 
child and parent. The responsibilities of care and support a parent has towards a child, 
and the  
 
35   The question whether children have a composite right to individual self-determination to choose their  own life 
style, religion and opinions regardless of the authority of their parents, will be addressed infra.  
36    428 US 52 (1976) quoted by De Waal et al (n 1) 456.  
37   De Waal et al (n 1) 56 argue that s 9 may prove to be particularly useful for children since it presumes that 
discrimination based on age is unfair.  This would mean that there must be a good reason for not according the 
same rights, privileges or benefits to children as adults. One such example of arbitrariness may be the fact that 
in terms of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 a minor may decide to terminate a 
pregnancy, but parental consent is required in terms of s 39(2) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 for any other 
operation.  
38    De Waal et al (n 1) 57. Bekink & Brand (n 26) 180 elaborate to some extent on this explanation by   
stating that if these rights to, for instance, privacy, freedom of religion or of expression, are limited by parental 
authority, this limitation can be justified by a parent’s duty of care and support toward the child.  
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rights and powers a parent can exercise toward a child in order to meet those 
responsibilities, limit the extent to which a child can lay claim to his or her self-
determination.
39  
 
4.2  Personal rights of the child: The right to a name and nationality from birth  
 
28(1) Every child has the right –  
(a) to a name and nationality from birth;  
The right to a name is aimed at the provision and protection of a child's legal identity. 
Every child's birth must be registered in terms of the Births and Deaths Registrations 
Act 51 of 1992.  If a child’s birth is registered his or her name and particulars are 
entered into the population register. A name entitles a child to have his or her birth so 
registered. It also enables a child to exercise many of his or her other legally protected 
rights, e.g. the right to vote once he or she has attained the requisite age to do so. 
Section 9(6) of this Act conveys that no person's birth shall be registered unless a 
forename and a surname have been assigned to him. The right to a name, therefore, 
includes the right to have a person's name registered by the State at birth.
40 
The 
constitutional right to have a name at birth has important implications for adopted 
children’s searches for their parents’ identities. Section 25 of the Child Care Act 74 of 
1983 permits an adopted child's surname at birth to be  
 
 
 
 
 
 
39   Bekink & Brand (n 26) 181. Parental authority as such is not protected by the Constitution. Parents do not, 
therefore, derive a right from the Constitution to veto their daughter’s decision to terminate her pregnancy. In 
terms of s 5(3) of the Choice on the Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996, a medical practitioner must 
advise a minor to consult with her parents before performing an abortion. However, the termination of the 
pregnancy may in terms of the same section not be refused if the child refuses to consult with her parents.  
40   Bekink & Brand (n 26) 181. In the South African context, this right is of a rather unique nature as is illustrated by 
the following example: On 18 July 1918 a boy was born in Umtata and given the name Rohlihlahla (meaning 
‘pulling the branches of a tree’ or ‘troublemaker’).  When the boy whose last name was Mandela, reached the 
age of seven, he was sent to a school of the Wesleyan Church. On the first day of school his teacher informed 
him that he would henceforth answer to the name of Nelson. It was not uncommon for Africans to be given, or to 
assume, a Western pseudonym that would facilitate communication with non-African instructors or employers. 
Against this background, it may well be that the right of an African child to be known under his or her real name 
inspired this clause in the Constitution.  
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changed to that of the adoptive parent or parents.  This provision may be seen to violate 
the right of the child to a name from birth. However, it does seem to be reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.
41 
 
This section also affords every child the right to a nationality from birth. The aim of this 
section is clearly to guard against statelessness with regard to children, rather than to 
operate as a direct means of acquiring South African citizenship.
42
 In this sense one can 
say that the right to nationality is intended to protect a child's international legal identity 
and particularly to protect a child against the loss of South African nationality.
43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41  Unless special provision is made under national legislation for accessing the birth records of adoptees, s 25 can 
operate to undermine the right of adoptees to know their legal identity at birth. The denial of a child information 
about his or her parents may lead to genealogical bewilderment. See De Waal et al (n 1) 458; Van der Vyver (n 
3) 304; Bekink & Brand (n 26) 181.  
42   Keightly ‘Nationality’ in Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family 83. Keightly argues that this is evidenced, first, 
by the fact that the right attaches to all children and not only to those who are South African citizens and, 
secondly, by the fact that what is guaranteed is a right to a nationality and not to South African nationality. In the 
third place, she argues that this section refers to the right to nationality rather than to citizenship. This indicates 
that the section is concerned with a broad, external relationship between a child and a state, rather than with the 
narrower, internal relationship implying domestic legal rights and obligations.  The section is therefore aimed at 
ensuring that every child in South Africa has a claim to fall under the protection of a state, even if the state is not 
South Africa. Of course, if a child is entitled to South African citizenship, the concept of citizenship and 
nationality would converge and the child's right to nationality would be satisfied by the state’s recognition of his 
or her citizenship. While this subsection does not directly guarantee South African nationality for children within 
South Africa's borders, it may have the effect of placing obligations on the State to grant South African 
citizenship to certain children, particularly those who are, or are potentially, stateless.  
43   Bekink & Brand (n 26) 182. The authors convey that nationality as a legal status enables a person to exercise the 
international dimension of citizenship. As such, it denotes a person's right to a passport of the country of his or 
her nationality and also the right to protection by the state of nationality if he or she is injured in another country. 
While this right is widely recognised in international law, it has particular historical significance in South Africa. 
During the apartheid years many South Africans lost their South African nationality when they became nationals 
of the so-called homelands. This meant, amongst other things, that they could no longer move about freely in 
South Africa, were not entitled to South African passports and were not entitled to South African diplomatic 
protection abroad. See too Van der Vyver (n 3) 304; De Waal et al (n 1) 459; Keightly (n 42) 84. Van der Vyver 
305 sounds a serious warning, though. In the United States all persons born within the country, including those 
of alien parents and even of illegal immigrants, are entitled to United States citizenship.  It is not sure what is 
meant by ‘every child’ and ‘nationality from birth’ in this provision. American generosity in regard to citizenship 
by birth stemmed from a misinterpretation of Calvin's Case, decided in England in the 17th century, and there is 
no reason  
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4.3 Family rights of the child  
28(1) Every child has the right –  
(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when 
removed from the family environment;  
Background  
It is submitted that the right of the child to family or parental care can only be 
appreciated if cognizance is taken of the specific socio-economic background 
underlying the need for the protection of these rights in the Constitution. The policy of 
apartheid which formally regulated racial affairs, had a particularly devastating impact 
especially on Black families and the children of such families.  The constitutional 
measures were meant to remedy a wrong so negatively experienced by a substantial 
portion of the population that specific protection of these rights of children were 
considered appropriate. The question that needs to be answered, though, is whether 
the constitutional measures are sufficient to remedy the wrongs done in the name of 
apartheid.  
During the apartheid era, the right to own, occupy, or use land, by and large depended 
on a person's racial credentials.
44
  The Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 bore out on this, 
aiming as it was, at dividing the whole country into separate areas each destined for 
exclusive occupation by members of a particular racial group. When such a group area 
was proclaimed for occupation, members of other groups became ‘disqualified persons’ 
in terms of the Act and occupation of the land or premises in question was illegal if non-
members did not hold a permit. An offence was also committed by a person who 
allowed a disqualified person to occupy. Members of a specific group who were lawfully 
in occupation before the area was proclaimed, had a moratorium of at least one year 
before their presence became proscribed. Thereafter, any contract from which a 
disqualified person derived his or her right of occupation  
 
whatsoever why the same generosity should be applied when interpreting s 28(1)(a) of the South African 
Constitution. See Robinson ‘An overview of the provisions of the South African Bill of Rights with specific impact 
on its impact on families and children affected by the policy of apartheid’ in 1995 Obiter 99 et seq and the 
sources referred to there.  
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(e.g. a lease) lapsed automatically and the person concerned could be ejected from the 
land or premises by an order of a local magistrate.  
In terms of the provisions of this Act (and also others not specifically mentioned) all 
Blacks who became citizens of the so-called TBVC-countries (Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) legally were foreigners in South Africa, the 
intention being that they were to exercise their political rights in their homelands.  
However, these provisions were only part of the picture and had to be viewed in 
conjunction with other legal measures aimed at securing the benefits of cheap labour for 
‘white South Africa’ which was available by the abundance of unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour. A system of influx control was consequently set up  
[t]o balance two apparently contradictory white needs -an exclusionary need to obtain political 
security by controlling and policing the number of Africans in white areas, and an inclusionary 
need to ensure a supply of cheap labour within these areas.
45  
 
The major industrial and commercial areas of South Africa were all in ‘white areas’. To 
ensure an adequate and cheap labour supply in these areas, but simultaneously 
keeping African families in the rural areas, a battery of controls and regulations was 
created.  African labour was to enter cities only on a temporary basis and influx controls 
were set up to admit only those who were able bodied, willing to work on short term 
contracts and usually who were male.  
Section 10(1) of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 was the legal 
instrument by means of which the influx of Blacks into the industrial and commercial 
areas was regulated. Urban residential rights were granted in terms of section 10 and 
the qualifications required for such rights were high. Section 10(1)(a) rights were 
available only to those who were born in a town and had lived continuously in that town 
for a period of 15 years since they were born. Those who had worked continuously in 
registered employment in  
  Budlender ‘Labour law, influx control and citizenship: The merging policy conflict’ 1984 Black Urban Law 159.  
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one town for 10 full years for one employer or had lawfully and continuously lived in one 
town for 15 years, qualified for section 10(1)(b) rights. The wives, daughters and 
unmarried sons under the age of 18 years of those with section 10(1)(a) rights, and, to a 
limited extent, those with section 10(1)(b) rights, had a legal right in terms of section 
10(1)(c) to remain with them once they had taken up residence with them in town.  
Besides Black people residing in ‘white’ areas in terms of section 10, Blacks could enter 
the areas by means of a migrant labour system, which was established to provide 
labour within these areas.  The premise of the migrant labour system was that a large 
number of Blacks would reside in ‘white’ areas only when their labour was required, but 
would be resident in the homelands at all other times. No contract could be for a period 
in excess of one year, after which the worker had to return to the homeland.  
Administrative policies also played a major part in the process of exclusion. The 
Government's housing policy for example served as an instrument of influx control.  In 
1958 it was decided by Government that no funds would further be made available to 
local authorities to subsidise the provision of sub-economic housing for Blacks. Because 
local authorities were now required to finance the building of such housing out of their 
own funds, new housing stock was not even sufficient to cater for the natural increase of 
the Black population in the cities, let alone the population growth arising out of the 
process of urbanisation. In 1968 comprehensive regulations were introduced to control 
the occupation of housing in Black residential areas. The regulations strictly limited the 
categories of people for whom family homing could be provided and made it a criminal 
offence to live in a Black residential area without a specific permit issued by the 
township superintendent.  
Despite criticism, Government always maintained that the influx control measures were 
merely to safeguard urban Black families from competition from rural immigrants. The 
view was substantiated to a degree by a policy in terms of which employers were not 
permitted to requisition for rural labour if there were urban Black people available to do 
the work.  In practice, though, the effect of the system of influx control on urban African 
family life was devastating. The family was protected by law only when both parties had 
section 10 rights.  In cases where one or both parties were in town illegally, influx 
control could prevent recourse to the law to regularise their de facto family. The way in 
Prof JA Robinson  PER/PELJ 2003(6)1 
43/112 
 
which this occurred, was as follows: Where a couple wished to marry, but the man did 
not have section 10 rights, the woman could legally loose hers if they married. 
Consequently many women preferred staying unmarried rather than losing their 
residence rights.  Due to attitudes generated by customary law, such women did not 
decline to have children, since producing children for a man is generally considered to 
retain him, whether in or out of marriage. Male objections to birth control were 
widespread. To these considerations were added the impact of urbanisation, backed by 
only minimal social security, which ensured that children, in or out of wedlock, remained 
desirable.  
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In the event where the man, but not the woman, had section 10 rights, she could only 
join him after marriage if she had section 10(1)(a) rights and approved accommodation 
in the form of his house; permission to occupy accommodation in someone else's house 
was not sufficient. This requirement effectively prevented most wives and children of 
section 10(1)(b) men of joining them. Consequently, while men could well marry rural 
women despite this requirement, the prevention of their families from joining them 
meant that such men frequently had second, irregular, families with women already 
qualified to live in town.  
The impact of these measures on family life among Black families hardly need 
elaborated upon. It was impossible for a migrant worker to bring his family legally to 
town to live with him. As the administration of influx control became more efficient and 
penalties for illegal residence became more severe, it was increasingly becoming 
difficult to reside illegally. Self-built homes and shelters were demolished in systematic 
fashion. The increasing number of landless people in the so-called bantustans caused 
by the forced removal of people from ‘white areas’ and their dumping in closer 
settlements, markedly led to a deterioration in family structures.  If the family had 
access to land previously, and therefore to subsistence, the permanent family unit 
usually consisted of the children, women of all ages and old men, the able-bodied men 
working elsewhere. Although these units did not have the qualities of a normal family 
group, it nevertheless provided some sort of a stable nuclear unit with recognised 
structures. However, where there was no land, many family units only consisted of a 
grandmother and a large number of children abandoned her care. These children often 
grew up, literally learning nothing at all.  
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In urban areas the destruction of family life had different roots, but the consequences 
were equally disastrous. As indicated above, it was made very difficult for the families of 
people qualifying in terms of section 10 to join him or her in the ‘white’ area. 
Government's manipulation of housing which had been designed to control the 
presence of Black people in urban areas, led to waiting lists in all areas to grow to 
unmanageable proportions. The gross overcrowding which had resulted, distorted the 
whole pattern of family life in the Black community.  Houses built for nuclear family units 
were bursting at the seams with three or four generations vying with one another for 
space. Privacy rarely existed and the consequent distortions in family relationships lead 
to brother turning against brother in their attempts to obtain the tenancy of the family 
home upon the death of the parents.  
Presently the phenomenon of street children (and the concomitant crime rate) is a major 
problem in South Africa. Poverty and poor welfare conditions surely are at the root of 
the problem and when one considers the general state of family life as set out above, it 
comes as no surprise to learn that the rate of births adding to the over 60% illegitimacy 
rate is rapidly increasing.  It is commonly accepted that the ever increasing number of 
street children is directly linked to the lack of housing. In fact, it was ironical that the 
homes that were demolished often were those of families who in one way or another 
struggled to maintain a family life. Once the shelter was demolished, the family was 
almost always divided, because there was nowhere else to stay together. The state of 
affairs lead an author to conclude that  
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[m]any, many others have lost all understanding of family organisation and gave up the struggle 
long ago. It merely created new anxieties. … There are dozens of other aspects of the 
destruction of family life directly caused by the apartheid system. … we have a national disaster 
on our hands.
46  
 
 
The Constitution does not protect the family qua institution.  To my mind this should 
have been the focal point of section 28(1)(b).  The urge for the rebuilding of the family 
structure has already in 1983 been voiced as “probably the most fundamental problem 
that will face any democratic government coming to power in the future.” It is submitted 
that the provisions of section 28(1)(b) fail to meet this challenge and to remedy the 
wrongs done to families in the name of apartheid. In fact, not only should the protection 
of the family as an institution have been provided for, but concomitantly, the right of 
parents to care for, and educate their children.
47
 At the same time the duty of the State 
to watch over a parent’s exercising of his or her rights should also have been stipulated 
for.
48  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46    Duncan ‘On the Family’ 1983 Work  in Progress 38.  
47  Constitutional Principle II of Schedule 4 of the Interim Constitution (n 1 supra) required the Constitution to include 
universally accepted fundamental rights. The Bill of Rights does not contain explicit protection of the right to 
marry and to raise a family. In the First Certification Judgement (n 1) the court held that no single universal right 
to family life and marriage could be identified. Furthermore, the court held that diverse societies tend not to 
include such a right in their constitutions for the fear of constitutionalising one particular family form to the 
exclusion of others. By refraining from entrenching a right to family life, the framers of a constitution mean to 
avoid difficult arguments about protection of the nuclear or the extended family.  According to the court the 
Constitutional Assembly took the option of tolerance for diversity.  A trinity of values (human dignity, freedom 
and equality) will play an important role in the protection of marriage and family life.  These values would 
prohibit arbitrary State interference in the right to marry or to establish and raise a family.  It can be concluded 
therefore that this exposition of the court destines dignity for the constitutional protection of the family. In par 
100 the court explains that there can be no doubt that the Bill of Rights prohibits the kinds of violations of family 
life produced by the apartheid system and the institutionalised migrant labour system. Without entering into 
debate on the issue, one can conclude that the court interprets the obligations of the State primarily as a 
negative one – the State is not to interfere in family life. Regrettably, though, no mention is made of protection 
for the family as an institution or of a positive obligation on the State to occupy itself with the rebuilding of 
families e.g. by implementing policies aimed at such upliftment.  
48  For a comprehensive discussion of the contents of this paragraph, see Burman ‘The interaction of legislation 
relating to urban Africans and the laws regulating family relationships’ 1985 Urban Black Law 89; Duncan (n 46) 
38; Chaskalson ‘The right of Black persons to seek employment and be employed in the Republic of South 
Africa’  
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Nature of the right  
The right to family care or parental care requires the family
49 
or parents of a child, or the 
State, to provide care to that child.
50
 By using the word ‘care’, the Constitution radically 
deviates from the notion of parental ‘authority’ of the common law.
51
 There can be little 
doubt that the authority of the pater has lost  
 
 
 
 
 
 
      1985 Urban Black Law 33; Patel Children and Women in South Africa: A Situation Analysis 1993. (Report for 
UNICEF); Corder ‘The right and conditions of entry into and residence in urban areas by Africans’ 1985 Urban 
Black Law 45; Budlender (n 45) 159.  
49   In Heystek v Heystek 2002 2 SA 754 (T) the court interpreted s 28(1)(b) to read that parental care is not confined 
to natural parents but that it also extends to stepparents, foster parents and adoptive parents.  
50    It is important to note that the duty imposed in this case is a positive one.  This means that the duties implicated 
by this section are of the few imaginable instances where a positive constitutional duty will apply horizontally. 
See Bekink & Brand (n 26) 183. The provision that the child has a right to family care, includes the right to be 
cared for by the extended family. See Robinson “The Child’s Right to parental and Family Care: Some Brief 
Remarks’ in 1998 Obiter 329 et seq. This deduction can be made from the provisions of s 15(3) of the 
Constitution which reads as follows:  
      (a) This section does not prevent legislation recognising –  
          (i) marriages concluded under any tradition, or system of religious, personal, or family law; or  
   (ii) systems of personal and family law under any tradition or adhered to by persons professing a particular 
religion. The tribal system that prevails among indigenous people in South Africa is well known. The emphasis 
in these social structures falls on the extended family as a means by which society is organised and one’s 
status is determined within the framework of his or her family. There can be no doubt that the true meaning of 
the words ‘any tradition’ in s 15(3)(ii) of the Constitution was to convey that the child's right to family care 
extended also to the extended family. It would appear that the family is to be regarded as the primary institution 
within which the child must grow up.  By placing the right to family care before the right to parental care, and by 
linking the concepts of family and parental care with the word ‘or’, the conclusion may be drawn that the 
Constitution attaches more weight to family care than to parental care when it comes to the care of children. The 
concept of parental care, which is typically reflected in terms of exclusivity in the sense that it relates to the 
nuclear family, must be elaborated upon by a definition of family that lacks such exclusivity. See e.g. Bethell v 
Bland 1996 2 SA 194 (W)  
51   The material elements of the duty implied by this right, in essence are contained in s 28(1)(c) and (d)   
of the Constitution. These subsections provide for the child’s right to basic nutrition, shelter, health care and 
social services as well as the right against maltreatment, neglect, abuse and degradation. These rights will be 
addressed infra. As indicated in the text accompanying n 9 supra, these instances should be seen as some of 
the few examples where horizontal application of the Constitution is implicated. In a most interesting decision in 
Jooste v Botha 2000 2 SA 199 (T) the court held that whereas it is clear that children have a legitimate interest 
in general physical, intellectual and emotional care within the confines of the capabilities of their care givers, it is 
significant that the Constitution does not state that parents are obliged to love and cherish their children or to 
give them  attention and interest. What s 28(1)(b) envisages, in fact, is a child in care of somebody who has 
custody over him or her. To that situation every child is entitled and the State is constitutionally obliged to 
establish, safeguard and foster such a situation.  The State may not interfere with the integrity of the family. 
Therefore, the court concludes, s 28(1)(b) sets out vertical socio-economic rights against the State. See too text 
accompanying n 54 infra. In Patel v Minister of 
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much of its harshness in modern South African law, as the best interest of the child 
invariably serves as a qualification to the exercise of parental power. However, its origin 
as an institution favouring the interest of the parents, rather than those of the child, 
remains. By stating that a child has a right to family or parental ‘care’, a definite nuance 
is placed on the parent-child relationship. The use of the concept care, denotes an 
acknowledgement that children are vulnerable and lack maturity of judgment and 
experience. This concept consequently has a radically different basis, namely that the 
parent-child relationship is to be defined in terms of the care that is owed to the child to 
assist him or her to overcome his or her own vulnerability and lack of maturity relating to 
judgement and experience.
52 
 
The material elements of the duty implied by this subsection are largely provided for in 
sections 28(1)(c) and (d). However, the aspect of love is not covered by these sections 
that, in essence, relate to the right of the child to basic nutrition, health services, shelter 
and social services and the right against maltreatment and neglect.
53
 The question 
whether a parent is constitutionally obliged to provide for his or her child’s intangible 
needs was  
 
 
 
Home Affairs 2000 3 All SA 256 (D) an illegal immigrant who was married to a South African national, was 
arrested and detained by virtue of a detention and removal warrant. In an urgent application to order the 
Minister to have him released from custody, it was contended, inter alia, that the particular statutory enactment 
was unconstitutional and in breach of the constitutional rights of the immigrant and his children to live together 
as a family. The court took into consideration that the respondents have not taken into account or weighed in 
the balance the right of the immigrant’s children to family or parental care. See too Heystek v Heystek (n 49 
supra). In this case the court held that the constitutional notion of parental care and the paramountcy of the best 
interests of the child require an attitudinal shift from an antiquated Germanic parent and child relationship, which 
formed the substratum of the common law, to the rights of the child, which includes parental care and family 
care. See too Allsop v McCann 2001 2 SA 706 (C); Swarts v Swarts 2002 3 All SA 35 (T).  
52   Robinson (n 50) 333.  It is not foreseen that the use of ‘care’ in the Constitution will lead to major changes in 
South African law. The High Court as upper guardian of all children in its jurisdiction, has in any case always 
seen its function to protect and advance the best interest of children. Nuances that may be expected to result 
because of the emphasis on the child's right to care, may, in conjunction with the right of the child that his or her 
best interests shall be of paramount importance, relate to the permission required by the child to marry.  In 
terms of the Marriage Act, 25 of 1961 a court may interfere in the refusal of the parents to the marriage of their 
child on the grounds that the refusal was without sufficient reason and that the consent to such marriage would 
be in the best interests of the child. It is submitted that in view of the fact that care only aims at serving the 
interests of the child, this provision will have to be reconsidered.  
53   See text accompanying n 87 infra.  
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dealt with in the case of Jooste v Botha.
54 
In this case the plaintiff was an 11 year-old 
boy born from an extra-marital relationship. He based his claim for delictual damages 
for, amongst others, emotional distress and loss of amenities of life, on the 
constitutional ground that he had a right to parental care. These damages were caused 
by his natural father’s refusal and failure  
… to admit that he is his natural son; to communicate with him; to render him love, cherishment 
or recognition; to show any interest in him; and to take any steps that would naturally be 
expected of a father towards his son.  
 
Taking as its point of departure the unenforceability of conjugal rights by order of court, 
the court states that not only in its relationship between man and woman is marriage 
unique, but so are also the multiple relationships that flow from such union. It is true that 
a bond of kinship evolves which society expects of parents and children to honour. But it 
does not grant rights to, and impose concomitant obligations, upon the parties except in 
the economic sphere. Where there exists no legal obligation on parents to love their 
legitimate offspring, it is axiomatic that there can be none in respect of extra-marital 
children.
55
 It can be concluded, therefore, that the bond of love is not a legal bond and 
neither the common law nor statutory law recognises the right of a child to be loved, 
cherished, comforted or attended to by a non-custodian parent as creating a legal 
obligation.  The court also advances another reason, namely lex non cogit ad 
impossibilium – the law will not enforce the impossible.  Law cannot create love and 
affection where there are none. Relying on the rule ubi remedium ubi ius, (there is only 
a right where there is a remedy) the court held that it would be rather senseless to 
interpret the right of the child to parental care so as to impose an obligation to love the 
child if such an obligation would not be possible to enforce legally.
56 
 
The wording of section 28(1)(b) relating to parental or family care, initially caused 
uncertainty with regard to the question who is to be considered the  
54   n 47 supra at 201.  
55   at 206 A-G.  
56   at 209H.  
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primary caregivers of the child. The right to parental or family care is a typical social 
right that is enforceable against the State. As a so-called second-generation right, it 
places the State under an obligation to act positively towards the fulfilment of the 
particular right. The question that arose, was whether this right could be treated on the 
same basis as the right, for instance, to adequate housing.
57
 This issue has now finally 
been solved. The Constitutional Court held in Government of the RSA v Grootboom
58 
that the constitutional obligation to provide shelter to children is imposed primarily on 
the parents or family and only alternatively on the State. The obligation of the State, 
therefore, is to provide shelter to those children who are removed from their families. 
The Constitution does not create any primary State obligation to provide shelter on 
demand to parents and their children if children are being cared for by their parents or 
families.  
The right of the child to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family 
environment clearly operates against the State. This provision inhibits legislation or 
administrative action which has the effect of separating children from their parents. The 
primary duty to provide care to a child rests on his or her parents and family. Apart from 
the duty incumbent on the State to provide alternative care when family or parental care 
is lacking, the right of the child in terms of this subsection imposes an obligation on the 
State to respect existing family or parental care and to limit its interference in such 
existing care to cases where it is justified.
59 
 
57   It is self evident that if one were to argue that the right of children to family care or parental care qua second 
generation right is unambiguous in its wording and that the State is directly responsible to provide family or 
parental care, the implication would be that the common law rights of parents, and custody law rights of families 
as instances of first responsibility towards the child, would be disregarded. This could never have been the 
intention behind this subsection as it would imply that parents and families would be delegates of the State in 
the caring and upbringing of their children.  As such it could also bring the result about that the best interest of 
the child would be the determining factor in the parent-child relationship or family-child relationship. Such a 
consequence is simply not tenable as parents and families are under a constant duty under a variety of 
circumstances to consider what would be the best for the child. Except for the fact that from a legal theoretical 
point of view it would be wrong to burden parents and families with this criterion, it would also not be practical to 
apply it in the day-to-day life of children. See Robinson (n 50) supra 336.  
58   2001 1 SA 46 (CC) par 77. See further discussion of the Grootboom case in n 88 infra.  
59   Bekink & Brand (n 26) 185; De Waal et al (n 1) 460.  
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The right to alternative care includes the right to adoptive or foster care and the right to 
be cared for by the State when the child is in need of care. The Child Care Act
60
 
contains comprehensive provisions regulating such alternative care. Bekink and Brand 
warn, however, that the manner in which a decision to remove a child from the care of 
his or her family and placed in the care of the State is taken and implemented, is open 
to criticism.  This is so largely because such decisions in general terms do not provide 
sufficiently for the participation of the child or parents in the decision to take the child 
into care, and also that they do not provide sufficiently for measures through which the 
cohesion of the family may be maintained while the child is in State care.
61 
 
Specific instances relating to children’s rights and parental care within 
constitutional prescriptions  
 
(i) Children’s rights with regard to custody upon divorce of their parents  
The best interests of the child are the paramount consideration regarding custody qua 
incident relating to the day-to-day care and control of such child’s person. Once the 
particular needs of a child have been ascertained, the parents are assessed in order to 
establish which parent would be the more suitable custodian, having regard to the 
individual personalities and qualities of the parents and also their respective 
circumstances. What is in the best interests of the child is a question of fact that has to 
be established ad hoc in each individual case. It is an objective assessment within the 
framework of the specific circumstances that pertain to each case.
62
 The interests of the 
child  
 
60   74 of 1983.  
61   Reference is made by the authors to, inter alia, the fact that legal representation for children in such proceedings 
is not compulsory and there is no appeal against a decision of the children’s court. Furthermore, rehabilitation of 
the child’s family while the child is in care is not pursued vigorously enough and children are often placed in care 
facilities unreasonably far from their homes, causing their parents not being able to visit them. See Bekink & 
Brand (n 28) 185; De Waal et al (n 1) 462; Van der Vyver (n 3) 306.  
 62   Palmer ‘The best interests criterion: An overview of its application in in custody decisions relating to  divorce’ in  
  Keightly  Children’s Rights 102 warns that the concept of best interests of the child may be indeterminate. She 
explains it thus: [i]t has thus become settled law in South Africa that where a custody decision is to be made by 
the Court, that decision is to be made in the light of the best interest of the children concerned: i.e.  an objective 
assessment within the particular framework of the specific circumstances that pertain to each case. The fact that 
the concept of best interests of the child is indeterminate is seen by many to be desirable. In this  
        way the ever-changing social values and standards and customs may be reflected in   
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refer to the welfare of the child and welfare must be taken in its widest sense to include 
the economic, social, moral and religious considerations.
63 
Emotional needs and ties of 
affection must also be considered and in the case of older children, their wishes should 
not be ignored.
64  
 
decisions about the custody of children. Applying the concept is always difficult, 
because what is best for a specific child, or children in general, can be determined only 
if all the options are known, which, of course, is impossible.  Not only … but the ability to 
predict the future is beyond the best of us.  Knowing which factors to take into account 
when deciding what is in the child's best interests, is also difficult. Is the child's security 
and happiness paramount?  Is his  religious and moral welfare paramount?  Is his or her 
material welfare the most important consideration? How much weight, if any, should be 
given to the child's own wishes? These questions cannot be answered determinedly 
because the circumstances of each child and his or her family situation differ from that 
of another. Generally it is thought that a combination of these factors will best find out 
what is in the child's best interests.  
 
 
 
 
63    In McCall v McCall 1994 3 SA 201 (C) the court formulated a comprehensive list of criteria which  
 courts can use as a standard on the facts of a specific case to determine what custody arrangements will best 
serve the interests of the child concerned:  (a) the love, affection and other emotional ties which exist 
between parent and child, and the parent’s compatibility with the child; (b) the capabilities, character and 
temperament of a parent, and the impact thereof on the child's needs and desires; (c) the ability of the parent to 
communicate with the child and the parent’s insight into, understanding of and sensitivity to the child's feelings;  
(d) the capacity and disposition of the parent to give the child the guidance which he or she requires; (e) the 
ability of the parent to provide for the basic physical needs of the child, the so-called creature comforts, such as 
food, clothing, housing and the other material needs -generally speaking, the provision of economic security; (f) 
the ability of the parent to provide for the educational well-being and security of the child, both religious and 
secular; (g) the ability of the parent to provide for the child's emotional, psychological, cultural and 
environmental development; (h) the mental and physical health and moral fitness of the parent; (i) the stability or 
otherwise of the child's existing environment, having regard to the desirability of maintaining the status quo; (j) 
the desirability or otherwise of keeping siblings together; (k) the child's preference, if the court is satisfied that in 
the particular circumstances the child’s preference should be taken into consideration; (l) the desirability or 
otherwise of applying the doctrine of same sex matching; and (m) any other factor which is relevant to the 
particular case before the court. 
 64  See Dijl v Dijl 1966 4 SA 260 (R); French v French 1971 4 SA 298 (W). In French the court set out in   
order of importance four categories of considerations to determine a child's best interests. The primary test is 
how the sense of security of the child will be preserved. Secondly, the suitability of the custodian parent is to be 
tested by enquiring into his or her character, into the religion and language in which the children are to be 
brought up, and also into the fitness of the proposed custodian to guide the moral,   cultural and religious 
development of the child. Thirdly, material considerations relating to the child's well-being, and finally, the 
wishes of the child will be considered.  
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As set out above, section 9 of the Constitution prohibits unfair discrimination either 
directly or indirectly inter alia on the grounds of sexual orientation. In the case of Van 
Rooyen v Van Rooyen,
65 
a decision handed down immediately before the Interim 
Constitution came into operation, the best interests of children in an application for an 
order defining the applicant's rights of access to her minor children were considered in 
view of the fact that she had been participating in a lesbian relationship. The court came 
to the conclusion that any right thinking person would say that it is important that 
children stay away from confusing signals as to how sexuality of the male and female 
should develop.
66
 Such signals are given by the fact that the children know that, 
contrary to what they should be taught as normal or what they should be guided to as to 
be correct (that is, a male and a female sharing a bed), two females are doing this as a 
matter of preference and of mutual emotional attachment.  The court explains that this 
signal is detrimental to the child because it is the wrong signal.  
Gay/lesbian parents  
Van Rooyen has been emphatically rejected after the new constitutional dispensation 
came into force. In Ex Parte Critchfield
67 
the court concluded that   
[i]n a society such as ours which proscribes discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
these encounters can be viewed in no more serious a light than conventional adultery. … in my 
view, the Court should not be particularly concerned with the sexual predilections of litigants 
when it comes to custody matters. It encourages a voyeurism in public life that demeans us all. 
It is an entirely different matter where  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65   1994 2 SA 325 (W).  
66   Prior to the Interim Constitution a court would determine the public policy by relying upon previous 
precedents, and also by a priori deductions from broad general principles. As was the case with the English 
courts, it was not practice for litigants to lead sociological or economic evidence as to whether particular 
practices were harmful. See Olsen v Standaloft 1983 2 SA 668 (ZSC).  It is now clear that the constitutional 
ethos projected by the equality clause in the Constitution serves as the norm in terms of which private-law 
norms and principles have to be interpreted. See text accompanying n 16 supra. 
67   1999 3 SA 132 (W).  
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such predilections pose an actual or potential threat to the welfare, psychological or physical, of 
young children.  
 
In V v V
68 
it was found that the court in Van Rooyen had made a moral judgment about 
what was normal and correct with regard to sexuality and about homosexuality which it 
found to be abnormal per se.  Referring to the limitations allowed by the Constitution on 
fundamental rights, the court explains that there may well be situations where a court 
will override the equality clause in the best interests of the child, but it would then 
consider the reasonableness of such limitations. The court concludes, therefore, that a 
discriminatory order by a court against a lesbian mother for access rights to her children 
that is based solely on her sexual orientation will not easily pass constitutional muster. 
In the same way a court cannot take cognizance of racism or religious intolerance when 
it decides on the access of the mother to her children, it cannot take cognizance of 
prejudice in our society. To do that would be to unreasonably limit, or perhaps even 
negate, the essential content of the right not to be discriminated against on the ground 
of sexual orientation.
69 
 
68   1998 4 SA 169 (C).  
69   The development of jurisprudence with regard to the adoption of children by    gay or lesbian couples  
has proceeded along similar lines. S 17 of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 lists the categories of people entitled to 
adopt children. It specifically allows for the joint adoption of children by married couples and by “a married 
person whose spouse is the parent of the child”. It makes no provision for the joint adoption of children by 
partners in a same-sex relationship – if people involved in such a relationship want to adopt a child, it would only 
be possible if one such partner would adopt a child in his or her own right. Even though he or she may intend to 
raise the child with his or her partner, the partner will have no legally recognised rights in relation to the children. 
(In essence, the same argument relates to the provisions of the Guardianship Act 192 of 1993 – parents of a 
child born in wedlock have joint guardianship of the child.) This position is in contradistinction to married 
persons who may jointly adopt a child. They are then joint guardians of that child. In Du Toit v Minister Welfare 
and Population Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC) it was argued before the court that these provisions violated 
the rights of the applicants by unfairly discriminating against gay and lesbian parents on the grounds of sexual 
orientation and marital status. It was also contended that the absolute prohibition of joint adoptions by same-sex 
parents was not in the best interests of adoptive children who are placed in the families of adoptive parents 
involved in permanent same-sex life partnerships. Furthermore the argument was that the “non-parent’ partner 
in the relationship was denied due recognition and status as parent of the children. (In casu, both partners had 
applied in 1995 to adopt the children, but due to relevant statutory provisions, custody and guardianship was 
awarded to one only.)  The court held that the institutions of marriage and family are important social pillars that 
provide for security, support and companionship between members of our society and that these institutions 
play a pivotal role in the rearing of children. However, the court indicates that these issues must be approached 
on the basis that family life as contemplated by the Constitution can be provided in different ways and that legal 
conceptions of the family and what constitutes family life could change as social practices and traditions 
change. In addition, the paramountcy of the best interests of children must at all times be the guiding principle. 
Against this background, the court argues that the statutory provisions exclude from their ambit potential joint 
adoptive parents who are unmarried, but who are partners in permanent same-sex relationships and who would 
otherwise meet the criteria set out in the Child Care Act.  The exclusion of such people defeats the very 
essence and social purpose of adoption, which is to provide the stability, commitment, affection and support 
important to a child's development that can be offered by suitably qualified persons. Therefore, excluding 
partners in same-sex life partnerships from adopting children jointly where they would otherwise be suitable to 
do so, would be in conflict with the principle regarding the best interests of the child. The relevant provisions of 
the Child Care Act therefore deprive children of the possibility of a loving and stable family life as required by s 
28(1)(b).  The court adds that this is a matter of particular concern given the social reality of the vast number of 
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parentless children in South Africa. On this basis it is clear that the provisions are in conflict with s 28(2) which 
provides for the best interests of the child to be of paramount importance.  Of importance too, is the acceptance 
by the court that the non-recognition of the ”non-parent” partner, in the context of her relationship with her 
partner and of their relationship with the siblings, perpetuated the fiction of family homogeneity based on the 
one mother/one father model.  The court found on the evidence presented that the applicants constituted a 
stable, loving and happy family and that the failure by law to recognise the value and worth of the “non-parent” 
partner as a parent to the siblings was demeaning. As such, the failure limited her right to dignity. It must be 
emphasized, however, that the court strongly conveyed that in each decision concerning adoption, prospective 
adoptive parents should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to ensure that only suitable couples will be 
entitled to adopt children jointly. In the resent judgement of J&B v Director General: Department of Home Affairs 
(unreported as yet; Case No CCT 46/02 decided on 28 March 2003) a most interesting set of facts presented 
itself.  The applicants in the case have been partners in a same-sex life partnership since 1995. In August 2001 
second applicant gave birth to twins. They were conceived by artificial insemination. The male sperm was 
obtained from an anonymous donor. The female ova were obtained from the first applicant.  The applicants 
applied to be registered and recognised as the parents of the twins. There was, of course, no legal impediment 
with regard to the second applicant, as the “birth mother” of the children. However, the appropriate regulations 
to the Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992 only make provision for the registration of one male and 
one female parent.  In addition, the applicants sought to have s 5 of the Status of Children Act 82 of 1987 
declared constitutionally invalid on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the rights entrenched in the Bill.  
This section reads as follows:  
(1) (a) whenever the gamete or gametes of any person other than a married woman or her husband have been 
used with the consent of both that woman and her husband for the artificial insemination of that woman, any 
child born of that woman as a result of such artificial insemination shall for all purposes be deemed to be the 
legitimate child of that woman and her husband as if the gamete or gametes of that woman or her husband 
were used for such artificial insemination.  
(b) for the purposes of paragraph (a) it will be presumed, until the contrary is proved,  
that both the married woman and her husband have granted the relevant consent. The High Court struck out the 
words ‘married’ where it appeared in the subsections and read in the words ‘or same-sex life partner’ after the 
word ‘husband’. However, even though the Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or court of similar status 
may in terms of s 172 of the Constitution make an order concerning the constitutional invalidity of an Act of 
Parliament, such an order has no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court. Hence the application 
to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court found that in as much the provisions of s 5 do not permit 
the first applicant to become a legitimate parent of the children, they unfairly discriminate between married 
persons and applicants as permanent same-sex life partners. As such these provisions are inconsistent with the 
equality clause in s 9.  The court emphasises that comprehensive legislation regularising relationships between 
gay and lesbian persons is necessary. It is unsatisfactory for the courts to grant piecemeal relief to members of 
the gay  
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The Constitution does allow for fundamental rights to be limited by law of general 
application where the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on freedom and equality, and where it does not negate the essential 
content of the right. While it is clear that currently existing bigotry and its consequences 
does not in itself create a valid reason to limit the constitutionally guaranteed rights of a 
gay or lesbian parent, it is equally clear that while the child is growing up there may be 
strong recrimination from peers and other parents against such child when it becomes 
known that his or her parent is gay or lesbian.  The child may also become confused by 
the parent’s unwillingness to conform to a generally accepted norm. There is in terms of 
the equality clause indeed nothing abnormal or wrong about a homosexual relationship, 
but it may be in the best interests of a child to discriminate against its homosexual 
parent if that would be the only way in which the child would be spared unnecessary 
suffering.  
 
South African courts have in the past expressly favoured mothers when it came to the 
custody of their minor children. This was especially true of young children.
70 
It was only 
if the mother's character or past conduct rendered her unfit in the court’s opinion to have 
such custody, that preference would be given to the father. In the case of adolescent 
boys, however, the courts have  
Maternal preference  
 
 
 
 
and lesbian community as and when aspects of their relationships are found to be prejudiced by unconstitutional 
legislation. Where a statute is challenged on the ground of unfair discrimination against gays and lesbians on 
the grounds of their sexual orientation, difficult questions arise in relation to the determination of the particular 
relationships entitled to protection, and the appropriate relief. The precise parameters of relationships entitled to 
constitutional protection will often depend on the purpose of the statute.  It is not appropriate for courts to 
determine the details of the relationship between partners to same-sex, or for that matter heterosexual 
partnerships. It is also not for the courts to work out the details of the relationship between any such partners 
and their children. In casu the court has not heard any argument and has not considered the respective duties 
which might arise between the applicants in respect of the children. These are matters for the legislature to 
consider. See too National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC); 
Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 6 SA 1 (CC).  
70   In Dunsterville v Dunsterville 1966 NPD 594 it was held that:  
[e]perience goes to show that a child needs both a father and a mother, and that, if he grows up without either 
he will, to some extent, be psychologically handicapped. But the maternal link is forged earlier in the child's life 
than the paternal, and if not forged early may never be forged at all.  
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shown greater readiness to award custody to the father, other factors being equally in 
favour of both parents.
71 
 
The ‘maternal preference’ or ‘tender years’ principle can be seen as violating the 
equality clause in section 9 of the Constitution by discriminating between parents on the 
basis of gender.  Judicial awareness of all forms of chauvinism and sexism, the striving 
for equality between the sexes, and current changes (both nationally and internationally) 
in the traditional roles of parents and spouses, lead to value systems and societal 
beliefs underpinning the maternal preference principle being challenged.
72 
 
In Van der Linde v Van der Linde
73 
the court deviated from a previous exposition of the 
common law which advanced the maternal preference principle.  The court held that for 
decades it has been accepted that the quality of a parental role is determined by gender 
and further that mothering was a component of a woman’s being only.  At the present 
juncture it is to be doubted whether that acceptance can still be accepted as a 
universally prevailing axiom. The concept ‘mothering’ is indicative of a function rather 
than a persona and this function is not necessarily situated in the biological mother. It 
includes the sensitive attachment which flows from the attention devoted to the child's 
needs of love, physical care, nutrition, comfort, peace, security, encouragement and 
support. Only the parent who can satisfy this need will succeed in forging a 
psychological bond with the child and it is in this parent’s care where the child can 
experience his existence as having meaning and in which he will be sheltered and 
protected with affection.  Mothering assumes the showing of unconditional love without 
necessarily expecting anything in return. Mothering is a component not only of the 
woman's, but also of the man's being. In the past, society expected men to suppress 
that part of their personality because it did not fit the image of the man. Today the man 
has the freedom to reveal and live out his mothering feeling. A father can be  
71   In Manning v Manning 1975 4 SA 659 (T) the Court explains that  
[t]here comes a time … especially in the case of boys, when, all other things being equal, they require   the care 
and guidance of their father more than of their mother; this is especially the case when the boy is approaching 
the age of puberty.’  
72   Van Heerden et al. Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family 538.  
73   1996 3 SA 509 (O).  
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just as good a mother as the biological mother and naturally a mother can be just as 
good a father as the biological father. The quality of a parental role is not determined by 
gender.  
In Van Pletzen v Van Pletzen
74 
the court relied squarely on Van der Linde and 
concluded that the assumption that the mother is better able than the father to care for a 
child belongs to an era of the past.  It reiterated the acceptance that mothering is not 
only a component of a woman's being, but is also part of a man's being and that a 
father, depending on the circumstances, possesses the capacity and capability to 
exercise custody over a child as well as the mother.  
A more cautious approach was signalled, however, in Ex parte Critchfield.
75 
Pointing out 
that maternal preference is nowhere pertinently stated in the list of factors in McCall, the 
court concluded that, given the fact of the dynamics of pregnancy, it would not amount 
to unfair discrimination in the sense that it would be unconstitutional for a court to have 
regard to maternity as a fact in making a determination as to the custody of young 
children. However, it would amount to unfair discrimination, and it would 
correspondingly be unconstitutional, if a court were to place undue weight upon this 
factor when balancing it against other relevant factors. In fact, the court conveys that the 
only significance of the Constitution with regard to custody disputes is that the court 
must be astute to remind itself that maternity can never be, willy nilly, the only 
consideration of any importance in determining the custody of young children.
76 
 
In terms of section 28 of the Constitution, the best interests of the child remain the 
paramount consideration. Consequently, if a father can better provide what the court 
considers to be in the best interests of the child, he will be the  
74  1998 4 SA 95 (O).  
75  1999 3 SA 132 (W).  
76  A similar approach was voiced in President of the    
      Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) where the Court held that   
[I] … see no reason to doubt that, as a matter of fact in South African society, mothers not only bear a    
considerably greater proportion of the burdens of child rearing than fathers, but also that mothers, as a general 
rule, have a special role in relation to the nurturing and care of children.  
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proper person to be awarded custody of the child. Similarly, if the mother is better 
equipped, she should be awarded custody. With regard to the biological basis for 
differentiation, it can only apply to the position of very young children in respect of whom 
‘the support and succour’ given by the mother to the infant could be said to be ‘very 
direct and not comparable to that of a father.’
77 
 
 
One of the factors mentioned in McCall that the court should take into account is the 
child's preference if the court is satisfied that in the particular circumstances it should be 
taken into consideration. This approach corresponds with article 12 of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child 1989 which provides that States Parties to the Convention 
shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to 
express those views freely in all matters affecting him or her.  Such views are to be 
given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. If the court is 
satisfied that the child has the requisite intellectual and emotional maturity to express a 
genuine and accurate reflection of his or her feelings towards, and relationship with, 
each of the parents, in other words to make an informed and intelligent judgment, 
weight should be given to such expressed preference.
78 
 
The child’s preference  
In establishing the child's ability to make an informed and intelligent judgment, the 
subjective views of courts are sometimes found to influence their assessment. From 
Oppel v Oppel
79 
and Mathews v Mathews
80 
it appears that the courts were inclined to 
consider the age, rather than maturity of the child, as the deciding factor. In 
Greenshields v Wyllie
81 
the court, after acknowledging that children are ‘human beings 
and having personalities of  
 
       See also Madiehe (born Ratlhogo) v Madiehe [1997] 2 All SA 153 (B).  
77   In Madiehe the court cautions that custody of a young child is a responsibility as well as a privilege     
       and that it is not a gender privilege or a right. 
78   McCall supra n 59 at 207H-I.  
79   1973 3 SA 675 (T).  In this case it was held that a girl of eight years old was too young to express a   
       view with regard to access. See too Germani v Herf 1975 4 SA 887 (A).  
80   1983 4 SA 136 (SE). The Court held that the views of a 13 year old may not carry much weight, but    
       where a 17 year old girl expresses a wish, it is a factor which must be given serious consideration. 
81   1989 4 SA 898 (W).  
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their own, having emotional preferences of their own, being normal’, made the following 
observation:  
At the age of 12 and 14 it is particularly difficult to know who you are and where you are going 
and where you belong. Everyone knows that. I may add that I have four daughters. It is 
understandable that they may resent certain things, that they may dislike certain things, that 
they may not like … or at times even their mother or grandmother and at times not even their 
best boy friend.  That is normal. But the court also knows that as time goes by, their own 
perspective changes.  It is then that they long for having both the father and the mother; it is 
then that they regret not having built up a good relationship. … For those reasons, because the 
Courts know that children grow up, that their perspectives change, that their needs change, a 
court is not inclined to give much weight to the preferences of children of 12 and 14. It is not 
because what they say is not important but because the Courts know that there is more to it 
than the way they respond emotionally at this stage.  
 
A different approach was followed in Märtens v Märtens,
82
 McCall
83 
and Meyer v 
Gerber.
84 
From these cases it becomes evident that the courts are inclined to take the 
maturity of the child into account, rather than its age. In the Meyer case, the court was 
satisfied that the 15 year old son of the parties was endowed with enough emotional 
and intellectual maturity to have made a calculated and intelligent decision and that due 
weight should be attached to his stated preference and choice. The boy’s position was 
not something which had become established overnight. It was not an emotionally 
uninformed and  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82  1991 4 SA 287 (T).  The court considered it necessary to see and speak to the children, twins aged   
11 years, personally. It found that they were both attractive, talented and intelligent children who, though lacking 
in maturity because of their youthfulness, were able to speak their minds spontaneously and with as much 
confidence as they could muster under the circumstances.  
83   Supra n 63. In casu the court had a talk tête-á-tête with a 12 year old boy. The court found that the  
preference to stay with the father was conveyed explicitly and positively by an intelligent, articulate, persuasive, 
sincere and candid child who displayed a degree of maturity and intellectual development that satisfied the court 
that he was capable of forming and expressing an intelligent and informed judgment of what he subjectively 
believed to be in his best interests.  
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irrational expression of frustrations or worries but it bore the stamp of an important 
decision about which he had thought for a long while and in which he had conducted 
himself as a mature and responsible young man.
85 
 
 
(ii) The extra-marital child and his or her father  
Extra-marital birth results in certain limitations being placed on specifically the father’s 
rights and duties towards the child. The phrase een wijf maakt geen bastaard in 
essence still provides the philosophy on which the legal relationship between a child 
born out of wedlock and his or her parents is based. Recent legislation has done much 
to improve the legal position of extra-marital children, but some differences with regard 
to that of legitimate children are still in place.  
With regard to guardianship, the guardian of a child born out of wedlock is the mother of 
the child. The Guardianship Act 192 of 1993 left this common law position unchanged.  
The Children’s Status Act 82 of 1987 provides that where the mother is a minor and not 
married, the guardian of the mother is also the guardian of the child born out of wedlock. 
However, as soon as the minor mother attains majority status by getting married or by 
an order of court, she will become the guardian of the child.  
The natural father of a child born out of wedlock may apply to the High Court for an 
order granting him guardianship or custody of, or access to such child. The Natural 
Fathers of Children born out of Wedlock Act 86 of 1997  
 
 
84  1999 3 SA 550 (O).  In this case the court refrained from talking to the parties’ 15 year old son  
personally because the child had made a decision and had persisted therein. The court was prepared   
however, to take the boy’s preferences into account. 
85   The machinery is in place to ascertain the preferences of children whenever it is deemed necessary  
or desirable.  In terms of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987 and the regulations 
promulgated there under, the Family Advocate is able to canvass the genuine wishes of the child. With their 
experience and expertise in safeguarding the interests of minor children, they are ideally placed to establish the 
reliability of the preferences of children. The court, furthermore, has the power in terms of s 6 of the Divorce Act 
70 of 1979 to appoint a legal practitioner to represent a child of the marriage at the proceedings. It may order 
the parties or any one of them to pay the costs of the representation. In hotly disputed custody, guardianship or 
access cases, however, there will often be a conflict of interest between at least one of the parents and child 
concerned. For this reason, the court may well have to have recourse to the provisions of s 28(1)(h) of the 
Constitution and have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the State, if necessary at State expense, if 
substantial injustice would otherwise result. See text accompanying n 110 infra. 
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prescribes the conditions for such applications. First and foremost the court has to be 
satisfied that the application will serve the best interests of the child. It is also required 
that the court shall consider the report and recommendations of the Family Advocate. 
The factors to be considered include the following:  
• the relationship between the applicant and the natural mother and, in particular, 
whether either party has a history of violence against, or abuse of, the other or the child;  
• the relationship of the child with the applicant and the mother or with proposed 
adoptive parents (if any) or any other person;  
• the effect that separating the child from the applicant or the natural mother or any 
other person is likely to have on the child;  
• the attitude of the child in relation to the granting of the application;  
• the degree of commitment that the applicant has shown towards the child;  
• whether the child was born of a customary union according to indigenous law or 
custom or of a marriage concluded under a system of any religious law; and  
• any other fact that, in the opinion of the court, should be taken into account.  
 
Previously, only the mother as guardian of an extra-marital child had to consent to the 
child's adoption. To improve the position in which the fathers of such children found 
themselves, the Child Care Act has been amended so that the consent of both the 
mother and the natural father is now required for adoption, provided the father 
acknowledges in writing that he is the father of the child and that he has made his 
identity and whereabouts known.  
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The common law position with regard to access was simply that the father, not being 
endowed with parental authority over the child, had no access to the child.  It has often 
been conceded, however, that the court may grant reasonable access to the father if it 
would be in the interest of the child. The remedy was not granted lightly and additional 
requirements had to be met to satisfy the best interests principle. Against this 
background the Natural Fathers of Children born out of Wedlock Act comes as a relief. 
This Act does not give the natural fathers of such children an automatic right of access; 
it does define the procedure to be followed by these fathers in applying to the High 
Court for access rights to their children.
86 
 
 
Socio-economic rights of the child  
28(1) Every child has the right –  
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services;  
Along with the introduction of the new constitutional dispensation, the concept of social 
security was introduced. Various socio-economic rights pertaining to ‘everyone’ were 
included in the Bill of rights, while the right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care 
services and social services specifically relates to children.  In a sense this right gives 
qualitative content to the child's right to family, parental or alternative care. It provides 
the base-line goods a child is entitled to receive as components of that care. It is 
interesting to note that, on the one hand, this section provides for entitlement to a more 
expansive range of goods and services than a child would be entitled to in terms of 
sections 26 and 27. These sections provide for the right of everyone to access to 
housing, adequate food and water, medical services and social security and assistance. 
On the other hand, however, children's socio-economic rights are intended to guarantee 
for children a certain basic subsistence level of the same social and economic aspects 
that are provided for in more advanced form in sections 26 and 27. Therefore, section 
26(1) guarantees the right of 
 
 
86   See too Davel Introduction to Child Law in South Africa 33-39; Davel & Jordaan Law of Persons 107-  
       113. 
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everyone (and therefore also of children) to access to adequate housing, whereas 
section 28(1)(c) guarantees the right of children only to shelter; section 27(1)(b) 
guarantees the right of everyone to sufficient food and water, whereas section 28(1)(c) 
proclaims the right of children only to basic nutrition. The benefits to which a child is 
entitled in terms of section 28(1)(c) are thus of a narrower level than those they are 
entitled to in terms of sections 26 and 27. They are regarded as the very minimum a 
child requires in order to subsist, whereas the entitlements in terms of everyone's socio-
economic rights set the levels required for a person to live a full and dignified life.
87 
 
Furthermore, the entitlements of a child in terms of section 28(1)(c), as opposed to the 
entitlements of a child and everyone in sections 26(1) and 27(1) are unqualified with 
respect to the availability of resources.  Sections 26(1) and 27(1) are both qualified in 
the duties they impose by sections 26(2) and 27(2) respectively in that both subsections 
read that the State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of the particular rights. This 
means that the duties to provide access to housing, health care services, food and 
water and social security and assistance implied by these provisions have to be met by 
the State only progressively by means of reasonable legislative and other measures 
and within available resources. Section 28(1)(c) prima facie is not qualified by a similar 
provision.  As discussed in note 88 infra, the Constitutional Court decided differently, 
holding that by interpreting section 28(1)(c) as unqualified, children could become 
stepping stones for their parents instead of being valued for who they are.  
In the final instance, the entitlements to food, water, housing, health care services and 
social security guaranteed by sections 26 and 27 are access entitlements - indirect 
entitlements to the creation of an environment within which people who are reasonably 
self-sufficient can access the goods in question themselves, rather than being provided 
with those goods up-front. The entitlements to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care 
services and  
87  Bekink & Brand (n 26) 187. See too Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality 2000 3 BCLR 277 (C).   
      This decision will be considered comprehensively infra.  
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social services of section 28, on the other hand, are direct entitlements to the provision 
of the goods in question on demand.
88  
 
88   Bekink & Brand (n 26) 188.  In Grootboom there were in essence two questions before the court. In    
housing, thereby imposing an obligation upon the State to take reasonable legislative and other measuresto 
ensure the progressive realisation of this right within its available resources.  In the second place it was 
contended that s 28(1)(c) entitled all the applicants, including those adults without children, to shelter and that 
the children’s unqualified right to shelter placed the right of children to that minimum obligation beyond doubt. 
The facts of the Grootboom case were briefly as follows: The applicants, including a number of children, had 
moved onto private land from an informal settlement owing to the ‘appalling conditions’ in which they were living.  
They were evicted from the private land that they were unlawfully occupying. Following the eviction, they 
camped on a sports field in the area. However, they could not erect adequate shelters as most of their building 
materials had been destroyed during the eviction. They applied to the High Court for an order requiring 
Government to provide them with adequate basic shelter or housing until they obtained permanent 
accommodation. In an affidavit one of the litigants describes the conditions as follows:  
My family and I lived with my sister and her husband who have three children. We lived in a small shack which 
was approximately 20 square metres in size. The living conditions for me and my common law husband and our 
child became increasingly unsatisfactory in that the limited space which we had, allowed for no privacy. The 
further applicants, as far as I have personal knowledge in that regard, lived with their extended families and in 
many instances there were three to four families living in structures similar to the one of my sister. Certain 
applicants lived in an area in Wallacedene that had a water table problem resulting in the areas around such 
structures always being waterlogged. The situation was not suitable for the health of them and their children and 
asthma, flu and other illnesses were common in the area. The High Court dealt with the argument relating to s 
26 first. Following the decision in Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwa-Zulu Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) the 
court cautions against an excessively generous approach to these rights. It also reiterates that a court will be 
slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by political organs and medical authorities who deal 
with these matters. In view of the evidence placed before the court that a rational housing programme had been 
initiated at all levels of government and that the programme had been designed to solve the pressing problem in 
the context of scarce financial resources, the court refused to accept the argument pertaining to s 26.  In relation 
to s 28(1)(c), the court was referred to the dictionary meaning of shelter where it is set out as ‘[a] structure 
affording protection from rain, wind or sun; any screen or place of refuge from the weather. A place of temporary 
lodging for the homeless poor.’ The court concludes, therefore, that s 28(1)(c) provides for a right to be 
protected from the elements in circumstances where there is no need to remove a child from its parents. The 
primary obligation to maintain a child rests upon the parents.  Such an obligation includes the provision of 
shelter.  In the event where parents are unable to provide shelter for the children, s 28(1)(c) imposes an 
obligation on the State to do so, albeit that by the use of the word shelter the Constitution envisaged that such 
obligation falls short of adequate housing. The court furthermore conveys that from the dictionary definition of 
shelter, it must be accepted that it reflects a significantly more rudimentary form of protection from the elements 
than is provided by a house. However, a further question concerns the provision of shelter for the parents. The 
link between parent and child could be applied to argue for a different approach to s 28(1)(c).  The court 
emphasises that the child is the bearer of the right in terms of s 28(1)(c). In casu the applicants argued that 
reading s 28(1)(b) with s 28(1)(c) justified the creation of a derivative right, namely one possessed by the 
parents. As the family must be maintained as a unit, parents of the children who are granted shelter should also 
be entitled to such shelter. This means that the bearer of the right now becomes the family. The justification for 
such a conclusion is that a failure to recognise the parents would prevent the children from remaining within the 
family fabric. This would penalise the children and indeed the parents who, to a considerable extent owing to the 
ravages of apartheid, are unable to provide adequate shelter for their own children. The court points out that 
there is understandable concern that this interpretation of s 28(1)(c) could be used by parents to obtain access 
to housing which would otherwise be denied on the basis of the interpretation of s 26. It must be understood, the 
court explains, that s 28(1)(c) only envisages the concept of contemporary shelter. The provision of shelter to 
the children should therefore be of such nature that the parents may join them. This does not mean, however, 
that the parents become the bearers of a constitutional right which expressly provides that children have such 
right. An order which enforces a child's right to shelter must therefore take account of the need of a child to be 
accompanied by his or her parent. Such approach would be in accordance with the spirit and purport of s 28 as 
a whole. Furthermore, the court conveys that the question of budgetary limitations is not applicable to the 
determination of rights in terms of s 28(1)(c). The argument that the right to shelter, even temporary shelter, 
would have a dramatic impact on the budget in as much as all persons with children would be able to enforce 
this right on demand was rejected by the court. This right of children has not been made subject to qualifications 
of availability of financial resources. The court therefore concludes that a parsimonious interpretation of s 
28(1)(c) would deny shelter to the infant children of the applicants. This result would be incongruent with a 
constitutional instrument which envisages the establishment of a society based on freedom, equality and dignity. 
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To implement the right in this case so that shelter will be provided for the children in circumstances where they 
will be denied the psychological comfort and social support of their parents, would be to permit the break up of 
family life of a kind which the Constitution is determined to prevent. This decision came before the Constitutional 
Court by way of appeal. (See Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC)). The Constitutional 
Court also dealt with the interpretation of ss 26(1) and 28(1)(c).  However, it first dealt with the justiciability of 
socioeconomic rights in the South African Constitution. It referred to the decision of the Constitutional Court in 
the first Certification judgment (supra n 1) where the court held as follows: (T)hese rights are, at least to some 
extent, justiciable. As we have stated in the previous paragraph, many of the civil and political rights entrenched 
in the [constitutional text before this Court for certification in that case] will give rise to similar budgetary 
implications without compromising their justiciability. The fact that socio-economic rights will almost inevitably 
give rise to such implications does not seem to us to be a bar to their justiciability. At the very minimum, socio-
economic rights can be negatively protected from improper invasion. In view of the fact that s 7(2) of the 
Constitution requires the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill and that the courts are 
constitutionally bound to ensure that they are protected and fulfilled, the question is not whether such rights are 
justiciable, but rather how to enforce them in a given case.  The court explains that this is a difficult issue which 
must be explored on a case-by-case basis. Against this background the court considers the method of 
interpretation of the provisions of s 26 to establish the true meaning of the section. Like all other rights in the Bill, 
s 26 must be construed in its context. This requires the consideration of two types of context. On the one hand, 
rights must be understood in their textual setting. This requires a consideration of the Bill and the Constitution as 
a whole. On the other hand, rights must also be understood in their social and historical context.  All the rights in 
the Bill are inter-related and mutually supporting. Against this background there can be no doubt that human 
dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational values of our society, are denied those who have no food, 
clothing or shelter. Affording socio-economic rights to all people therefore enables them to enjoy the other rights 
enshrined in the Bill. It is clear that the right of access to adequate housing cannot be seen in isolation. There is 
a close relationship between it and the other socio-economic rights.  Socio-economic rights must all be read 
together in the setting of the Constitution as a whole. The State is obliged to take positive action to meet the 
needs of those living in extreme conditions of poverty, homelessness or intolerable housing. Their 
interconnectedness needs to be taken into account in interpreting the social economic rights, and, in particular, 
in determining whether the State has met its obligations in terms of them. This analysis serves as point of 
departure to establish whether the State has taken reasonable legislative and other measures bearing in mind 
that the State is under an obligation to progressively realise this right within its available resources. S 26(2) 
clearly does not impose an unqualified obligation on the State. The Constitutional Court rejects the approach of 
the court a quo that the State must provide rudimentary shelter irrespective of the availability of resources on 
the basis that this reasoning produces an anomalous result.  People who have children would have a direct and 
enforceable right to housing under s 28(1)(c) while others who have none, or whose children are adult, no 
matter how old, disabled or otherwise deserving they may be, would not be entitled to housing under this 
section. The carefully constructed constitutional scheme for progressive realisation of socio-economic rights 
would make little sense if it could be trumped in every case by the rights of children to get shelter from the State 
on demand. Moreover, the court warns that there is an obvious danger - children could become stepping stones 
to housing for their parents instead of being valued for who they are. The court also rejects the decision of the 
court a quo that the Constitution draws a distinction between housing on the one hand and shelter on the other, 
and that shelter is a rudimentary form of housing. Housing and shelter are related concepts and one of the aims 
of housing is to provide physical shelter. But shelter is not a commodity separate from housing. While it is true 
that all shelter represents protection from the elements and possibly even from danger, there is a range of ways 
in which shelter may be constituted. Shelter may be ineffective or rudimentary at the one extreme and very 
effective and even ideal on the other. The concept of shelter in s 28(1)(c) is not qualified by any requirement 
that it should be ‘basic’ shelter. The Constitution does not limit the concept of shelter to basic shelter alone. The 
concept of shelter in the subsection embraces shelter in all its manifestations.  However, it does not follow that 
the Constitution obliges the State to provide shelter at the most effective or the most rudimentary level to 
children in the company of their parents. The true nature of the obligation created by s 28(1)(c) can only 
properly be ascertained in the context of the rights created by other socio-economic provisions in the Bill.  
These provisions in ss 26 and 27 expressly oblige the State to take reasonable legislative and other measures 
within its available resources to achieve the rights with which they are concerned.  It is so that there is an 
overlap between these provisions and that of s 28(1)(c). Apart from this overlap, these provisions are conferred 
on everyone, including children, while s 28 accords rights only to children. This overlap is not consistent with the 
notion that s 28(1)(c) creates separate and independent rights for children and their parents. The court 
concludes, therefore, that the true nature of s 28(1)(c) can only be established if it is read in conjunction with s 
28(1)(b).  To ensure that children are properly cared for by their parents or families, and that they receive 
appropriate alternative care in the absence of parental or family care, is clearly the aim of these subsections.  It 
follows from s 28(1)(c) that the Constitution contemplates that a child has a right to parental or family care in the 
first place, and a right to alternative appropriate care only where that is lacking.  Through legislation and the 
common law, the obligation to provide shelter is imposed primarily on parents or family and only alternatively on 
the State. The State thus incurs the obligation to provide shelter to those children, for example, who are 
removed from their families. The right of a child to shelter does not create a primary State obligation to provide 
shelter on demand to parents and their children if children are being cared for by their parents or families. This 
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exposition does not mean, however, that the State incurs no obligation in relation to children who are being 
cared for by their parents or families. In the first place, the State must provide a legal and administrative 
infrastructure necessary to ensure that children are accorded the protection contemplated by s 28. This 
obligation would normally be fulfilled by passing laws and creating enforcement mechanisms for the 
maintenance of children, their protection from maltreatment, abuse, neglect or degradation. In addition, the 
State is required to fulfil its obligations to provide families with access to land, adequate housing, and to health 
care, food, water and social security. These rights require the State to provide access on a programmatic and 
co-ordinated basis. They are, however, subject to available resources. One of the ways in which the State would 
meet its obligation to provide social security, would be through a social welfare programme providing 
maintenance grants and other material assistance to families in need in defined circumstances.  
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28(1)(d) Every child has the right –  
(d) to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation;  
The right to family, parental and alternative care emphasises the importance of the 
family and parents in meeting the needs of children.  However, the old adage that ‘every 
(English-)man’s home is his castle’ has been recognised as often being detrimental to 
the well-being of children. Unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, addiction, criminality and 
family breakdown compound in serious abuses of children, often in their own home.
89
 
This right of children therefore imposes a duty on private persons as well as the State to 
refrain from these forms of treatment. In addition, it requires primarily of the State to act  
positively to prevent abuse, maltreatment, neglect or degradation. The obligation of the 
State is to intervene in situations of ongoing maltreatment, abuse, neglect and 
degradation in the family or another context by, for instance, removing the child from 
that situation.  In this instance the State is required to act positively to stop ongoing 
abuse.
90
 This duty is to  
89   See Bekink & Brand (n 26) 188; De Waal et al (n 1) 464; Van der Vyver (n 3) 306. 
90   Various statutory provisions, pre- and post the Constitution, serve as examples of legislative attempts  
to deal with the neglect, abuse or degradation of children. S 50 of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 makes itan 
offence to ill-treat a child or allow it to be ill-treated. It also makes it an offence to abandon a child.  The Sexual 
Offences Act 23 of 1957 contains various provisions that criminalise sexual intercourse with minors. S 9 
provides that any person who, being a parent or guardian of a child under the age of 18 years, permits, procures 
or attempts to procure such child to have unlawful carnal intercourse, or to commit any immoral or indecent act, 
with any person other than the procurer, or to reside in, or frequent a brothel; or who orders, permits or in any 
way assists in bringing about, or receives any consideration for, the defilement, seduction or prostitution of such 
child shall be guilty of an offence. A parent or guardian charged with contravention of this section is deemed to 
have knowingly permitted his or her child to consort with, or to continue in the employment of, a prostitute or a 
person with an immoral reputation. See also ss 12 and 14.  In terms of the last mentioned section a male person 
who has, or attempts to have unlawful carnal intercourse with a girl under the age of 16 years, or who commits 
or attempts to commit an immoral or indecent act with such a girl or a boy under the age of 19 years, is guilty of 
an offence. In addition, s 50 of the Child Care Act places an obligation on owners, occupiers, tenants, lessors 
and managers of buildings wherein the sexual exploitation takes place to report such incidents to the police. In 
terms of s 42(1) the Child Care Act an obligation is placed on dentists, medical practitioners, nurses and social 
workers to report child abuse. Initially the reach of this provision was limited in that it restricted the responsibility 
for reporting child abuse to specific health professionals and social workers. It excluded other professionals who 
would come into  
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some extent given legislative effect by the Child Care Act which empowers police 
officers, social workers and other authorised persons to remove children from their 
homes and take them to a place of safety under certain circumstances.
91
 Certain criteria 
are provided for by the Act for decisions to remove children from their families.
92 
 
Section 294 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 initially provided for corporal 
punishment also for juvenile delinquents. This provision, however, was declared 
unconstitutional on the basis that it was cruel, inhuman and degrading in S v Williams.
93 
Following this decision, Parliament passed the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
contact with children such as teachers, day care workers and the clergy. Therefore, in terms of an amendment 
in 1996, teachers and ‘any person employed by or managing a children's home, place of care or shelter’ are 
now also legally obliged to report child abuse.  
91   Bekink & Brand (n 26) 189 correctly point out that the State, in meeting this positive duty to intervene 
in situations of ongoing abuse to protect a child, acts in conflict with a child's right to family or parental care. This 
creates the need for a flexible test against which to decide whether a decision by a relevant government official 
to intervene or not to intervene in a situation of abuse is constitutionally sound. A State actor must exercise 
reasonable professional judgment in conducting the investigation into the alleged abuse and in the decision to 
act or not to act after the investigation. 
92   These criteria are set out as follows in s 14:  
[t]he children's court shall determine whether –  
(a) the child has no parent or guardian; or (aA) the child has a parent or guardian who cannot be traced; or  
(b) the child has a parent or guardian or is in the custody of a person who is unable or unfit to have the custody 
of the child in that he –  
is mentally ill to such a degree that he is unable to provide for the physical, mental or social well-being of the 
child;  
has assaulted or ill-treated the child or allowed him to be assaulted or ill-treated;  
has caused or conduced to the seduction, abduction or prostitution of the child or the commission by the child of 
immoral acts;  
displays habits and behaviour which may seriously injure the physical, mental or social well-being of the child;  
fails to maintain the child adequately;  
neglects the child or allows him to be neglected;  
cannot control the child properly so as to ensure proper behaviour such as regular school attendance;  
has abandoned the child; or has no visible means of support. 
93   1995 3 SA 632 (CC).  The court in casu held that no compelling interest has been proved to justify  
the practice of corporal punishment. It also found that its effect is likely to be coarsening and degrading rather 
than rehabilitative. Juvenile whipping, according to the court is cruel, inhuman and degrading and it cannot be 
justified in terms of the Constitution. In Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 
(CC) it was decided that the prohibition of corporal punishment was a justifiable limitation of the right to freedom 
of religion.  In this case the applicant was a voluntary association representing 196 independent schools with 
approximately 14 500 learners. The constituent schools maintained an active  
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Abolition of Corporal Punishment Act 33 of 1997. It remained uncertain, however, to 
what extent corporal punishment in schools and the home was constitutional.  In 
Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education,
94 
however, the court found that 
a provision in the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 which abolished corporal 
punishment in schools was a justifiable limitation of the right to freedom of religion.  
 
Economic rights of the child  
S 28(1) Every child has the right –  
(e) to be protected from exploitative labour practices;  
(f) not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services that –   
    (i) are inappropriate for a person of that child’s age; or  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christian ethos by providing a learning environment in which the learners could be educated in keeping with 
their Christian religion. The applicant challenged the constitutionality of the South African Schools Act 84 of 
1996. It sought to have the Act declared unconstitutional and invalid to the extent that it was applicable to the 
independent schools whose parents or guardians have consented to corporal punishment being imposed. The 
court decided that the constitutional right of persons belonging to cultural or  religious communities to enjoy their 
culture and to practice their religion could not be used to shield practices which offended the Bill of Rights. 
Assuming that corporal punishment as practised by applicant’s members was not inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Bill, these provisions of the Schools Act limited the religious rights of parents. The question, 
therefore, was whether this limitation could be justified in terms of s 36 of the Constitution.  In this regard the 
court explains that limitations on constitutional rights can only pass constitutional muster if it can be concluded 
that, considering the nature and importance of the right and the extent to which it is limited, such limitation is 
justified in relation to the purpose, importance and effect of the provision which resulted in the limitation taking 
into account the availability of less restrictive means to achieve the relevant purpose. What was at issue, 
therefore, was whether the impact of the prohibition on the religious beliefs and practices of the members of 
applicant could be justified under the limitations test of s 36.  The proportionality exercise had to relate to 
whether the failure to accommodate applicant's religious belief and practice by means of exemption could be 
accepted as reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, freedom and 
equality. The court emphasised that while parents could no longer authorise teachers to apply corporal 
punishment in their name pursuant to their beliefs, they were not deprived by the Schools Act of their general 
right and capacity to bring up their children according to their Christian beliefs. Furthermore, the State is under a 
constitutional duty to take steps to help diminish the amount of public and private violence in society generally 
and to protect all people and especially children from maltreatment, abuse or degradation. The outlawing of 
physical punishment in the school had a principled and symbolic function manifestly intended to promote 
respect for the dignity and physical and emotional integrity of all children.  
94   1999 9 BCLR 951 (SE).  
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(ii) place at risk the child’s well-being, education, physical or mental health or spiritual, moral or 
social  
    development.  
 
The protection of the right of children in this regard serves as recognition of the fact that 
child labour is an acutely experienced phenomenon in the South African community.
95 
Subsection (e) creates a positive obligation for the State to protect children against 
exploitative labour practices from other actors in society. Subsection (f) on the other 
hand imposes a negative duty in the vertical and horizontal relationship (thus also 
against private actors) to desist from engaging children in exploitative labour practices.
96 
 
 
From the wording of this article, it is clear that neither of these subsections imposes an 
absolute ban on child labour.
97
 It recognises the fact that thousands of children are 
engaged in paid labour of some kind and that the lives of such children, and in many 
instances that of their families, depend on their ability to earn an income in this way. 
The duty to protect children against  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95   Findings of a survey done by the South African Department of Labour in 1999 include the following:  
36% (4.8 million) of South Africa's 13.4 million children were doing at least three hours of economic work a week 
and/or five hours or more per week of school related work, and/or a seven hours or more of household chores;  
With a cut-off of 12 hours of economic activities per week, 14 hours of household chores and 12 hours of school 
labour, 12,5% (1.7 million) of children in South Africa  were doing work;  
Of the children engaged in economic activities for three hours per week or more, 59% said they were working 
because they had a duty to help their family, and a further 15%  said they worked to assist the family with 
money;  
Of those in agriculture, many were working in subsistence agriculture, on family farms, rather than as paid 
employees;  
Children aged 5-14 years who appear to be working in contravention of the law account for at least 30% of the 
working children concerned;  
Of the children engaged in a narrowly-defined economic work for three hours or more, 61% indicated that they 
were exposed to hazardous conditions, 2% conveyed that they have suffered illness related to the work and 4% 
that they had been injured at work.  
96    Bekink & Brand (n 26) 190.  
97    Socio-economic conditions in South Africa are often such that the income earned by a child,  
sometimes even of tender years, may be an essential, even the only, source of maintenance of a family.  The 
constitutional right of the child not to be required or permitted to provide services that are inappropriate for a 
person of that child's age, therefore also impacts on the duty of the State to provide social security. Such would 
include appropriate social assistance to persons and families unable to support themselves and their 
dependants.  This duty would require the State to take reasonable measures, within its available resources, 
towards that end. In circumstances of ultimate need, where for the sake of survival recourse  
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exploitative labour practices also does not require an absolute ban. What is required, is 
that the State takes measures to protect children against exploitation in the labour 
environment. The kind of exploitation a child is to be protected against, is in terms of 
subsection (f) exploitation caused by a child being required to do work that is 
inappropriate to its age and puts its wellbeing, education, physical or mental health or 
spiritual, moral or social development at risk.
98 
 
 
Rights of the child in the administration of justice  
28(1) Every child has the right –  
(g) not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, in addition to the    
rights a child enjoys under ss 12 and 35, the child may be detained only for the shortest 
appropriate period of time, and has the right to be –  
(i) kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18 years; and  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
has to be taken to child labour, the duty of the State becomes particularly compelling. See Van der Vyver (n 3) 
307. See too n 47 supra.  
98    ibid.  The current legislative framework for child labour is provided by s 52A of the Child Care Act 
and s 43 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 which took effect in March 1999. The last 
mentioned Act is the more important one as it deals explicitly with child work.  It prohibits employment of a child 
who is under 15 years old; who is under the minimum school leaving age (where this age is 15 years or older);  
who is over 15 years but under 18 years old, if the employment & is inappropriate for the age of the child or if 
the work places at risk the child's wellbeing, education, physical or mental health, or spiritual, moral or social 
development; & has been prohibited by the Minister of Labour through regulations. A person is considered an 
employee if that person  
works for another person and receives remuneration; or in manner assists in carrying on or conducting the 
business of an employer; and is not an independent contractor. S 52A of the Child Care Act contains a similar 
prohibition, namely that ‘no person may employ or provide work to any child under the age of 15 years.’ This 
clause has wider application than that of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.  It does not only outlaw 
employment of such children, but also provision of work. It is, for example, likely that this section prohibits giving 
work to a child who works as an independent contractor. S 46 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
provides that it is a criminal offence to assist an employer to employ a child in contravention of the Act, and to 
discriminate against a person who refuses to permit a child to be employed.  
Prof JA Robinson  PER/PELJ 2003(6)1 
73/112 
 
(ii) treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of the child’s age.  
 
A child, like everyone else, is entitled to the due process provisions in the Constitution: 
the rule against arbitrary arrests; proscription of detention without trial; protection 
against violence; freedom from torture and from cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment;
99
 and the guarantees of the basic norms of criminal procedure 
pertaining to persons arrested
100
 in detention
101
 and accused of a criminal offence.
102
 
This section specifically, read in conjunction with sections 12 and 35 of the Constitution, 
is of importance not only for the criminal justice system but also for the Department of 
Correctional Services. The specific wording of the section conveys that no child should 
be detained and that any detention of a child indeed constitutes a limitation of the right 
in itself.
103
 This right of children is qualified, however, since detention of children would 
be allowed if such detention could be regarded as a measure of last resort. 
Consequently, if this requirement has been met, it would render the detention of a child 
constitutionally sound. 
104
 It needs to be emphasised, though, that the protection given 
to children in this sub-section is in addition to the rights which children, like all other 
people, enjoy under sections 12 and 35 of the Bill. Section 12 guarantees to every 
person the right to freedom and security of the person. Section 35, on the other hand, 
affords various rights specifically directed at arrested, detained and accused persons, 
inclusive of children.
105 
 
The requirement that the child may only be detained for the shortest appropriate period 
of time, leaves a measure of doubt what will be regarded  
99   S 28(g) read with s 12(1) of the Constitution.  
100  S 28(g) read with s 35 (2) of the Constitution.  
101  S 28(g) read with s 35(2) of the Constitution.  
102  Ss 28(g) read with s 35(3) of the Constitution.  
103  S 36 of the Constitution. See too Bekink & Brand (n 26) 191; Van der Vyver (n 3) 309.  
104 Bekink & Brand (n 26) 191.  The authors convey that the Constitution is vague in this regard and that 
it does not provide a guide or an answer as to what will be regarded as a measure of last resort. They suggest 
that it would be safe to say that only if all other possible remedies have been explored and are not appropriate 
in the specific circumstances, detention can be regarded as a measure of last resort. An objective investigation 
and evaluation of all the relevant circumstances and factors of each specific case would have to be undertaken 
and the State will have to explore all other options before detention is finally decided upon. 
 105 Bekink & Brand (n 26) 191.  
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as the shortest appropriate time. It is suggested, though, that the surrounding 
circumstances would provide an indication. It would also be for the courts to determine 
certain minimum standards in this regard. In specific situations, the State carries the 
onus of satisfying the court that a detention period is necessary in the specific 
circumstances. Should the State fail in this regard, further detention would be 
unconstitutional and immediate release would be the most appropriate relief.
106  
 
When children are detained, whether awaiting trial or after being sentenced, they have 
the right to be kept separately from other detained persons over the age of 18 years. 
This protection measure acknowledges that children are more vulnerable than adults to 
the negative effects of the correctional environment. Special protection should therefore 
be provided to minimize the contact of children with other hardened criminals.  The 
younger the child, the more vulnerable he or she is and the more strictly separation 
should enforced.
107
 By keeping children away from adult detainees, the risk of them  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106  ibid.   
107  Even before the Constitution came into operation, legislative measures had been provided to protect  children in 
detention. S 276 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provides for ‘imaginative sentencing measures’ such 
as house arrest, monitoring, community service and placement in employment.  Juveniles may also be given the 
benefit of other alternative sentences, such as a fine,  postponement or suspension of sentence, or caution and 
the discharge, correctional supervision and converting the trial into an inquiry under the Child Care Act. This Act 
makes provision for placing the child in the custody of a suitable foster parent; sending the child to a designated 
children's home; sending a child to a designated school of industries; and returning the child, under supervision 
of a social worker, to the care of his or her parent or guardian.  See Also S v Williams 1995 3 SA 632 (CC). In S 
v Blaauw 2001 3 All SA 588 (C) an example of leniency of the court is to be found. In casu the accused had 
been convicted of raping a five year old girl. On appeal the court held that the sentence had to fulfil all the 
objectives of sentencing.  However, these objectives had to be applied within the framework of s 51 of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. This section stipulates certain minimum prescribed sentences for 
certain offences unless the court finds that ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ exist to justify a lesser 
sentence. The Act does not define ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’. As the complainant was five 
years old at the time of the rape, the offence fell within the ambit of s 51. In an attempt to establish the existence 
of substantial and compelling circumstances the court is to find weighty justification to warrant a departure from 
the rule. The minimum prescribed sentences may not be lightly departed from.  If the court is satisfied that the 
circumstances of the case render the prescribed sentence unjust in that it would be disproportionate to the 
crime, the criminal and the needs of society, and that an injustice would be done by imposing that sentence, it is 
entitled to impose a lesser sentence. In the case at hand the accused had committed a serious crime against a 
defenceless young girl. He also had a bad childhood and a low intelligence level. What was of importance in the 
view of the court, however, was the fact that the accused was 18 years and six weeks old when he committed 
the crime. In view of the poor conditions in South African prisons and that life-long incarceration might break the 
accused physically and emotionally, the court was prepared to accept that even though the  
Prof JA Robinson  PER/PELJ 2003(6)1 
75/112 
 
being negatively influenced or victimized would be avoided to a large extent, which, in 
turn, could enhance their chances of being rehabilitated.  
The requirement that the child in detention should be treated in a manner that 
takes account of its age, seems to indicate that the younger the child is, the more 
difficult it would be for the State to provide the basic treatment and conditions that 
a child of that particular age require. The detention of very young children would 
therefore seldom, if ever, be constitutionally allowed.
108109  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
accused was over the age of 18, his young age was a compelling and substantial circumstance which allowed 
the court to deviate from the prescribed sentence. 
108 Regrettably, there are statistics available indicating that in the period 1998-2003 a total of 74 children  
        between the ages of 7 (inclusive) and 14 (exclusive) were sentenced to prison. Of these, 40 were 13 
years old at the time of sentencing, 18 were 12 years old and 16 were between the ages of 7 and 11.  In the 
same period, 89 children aged 12 were kept in prison awaiting trial, while 36 children between the ages of 7 and 
11 were detained in prison while awaiting trial. 
109  After ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) the South African Law  
        Commission was requested to undertake an investigation into juvenile justice and to make 
recommendations to the Minister of Justice for the reform of this particular area of law. After a great many 
workshops and seminars were held to draft a bill on juvenile justice, there is currently a Draft Bill under 
discussion in which an effort is made to give effect to the provisions of the Constitution. The long title of the Bill 
describes what is included in the proposed legislation, namely to establish a criminal justice process for children 
accused of committing offences which aims to protect children's rights as provided for in the Constitution and 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child;  to provide for the minimum age of criminal capacity of such 
children; to describe the powers and duties of police and probation officers in relation to such children; to 
describe the circumstances in which such children may be detained and to provide for their release from 
detention; to make a diversion of cases away from formal court procedures a central feature of the process; to 
establish an individual assessment of each child and a preliminary inquiry as compulsory procedures in the new 
process; to create special rules for a child justice court; to extend the sentencing options available to such 
children; to entrench the notion of restorative justice; to provide for legal representation of children in certain 
circumstances; and to establish an appeal and review procedure as well as an effective monitoring system for 
the legislation. With regard to criminal capacity, the Bill also contains new provisions. At common law criminal 
capacity has been determined by the application of two well-known rules derived from Roman law. The first, that 
a child under the age of seven years is irrebuttably presumed to lack criminal capacity, and is consequently 
exempt from criminal liability, applies irrespective of the actual maturity, intellectual development or ability of a 
child below this age to form an intention. In terms of the second rule, a child above the age of seven years but 
are below the age of 14 years is rebuttably presumed to lack criminal capacity. The burden of  
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28 (1) Every child has the right –  
(h) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, in   
civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result;  
 
 
Section 35(3)(g) provides a right to accused persons in criminal proceedings to legal 
representation at state expense if substantial injustice would otherwise result. This right 
applies equally to children as it does to adults. Section 28(1)(h) extends this right to 
children involved in civil litigation. Section 8A of the Child Care Act now provides that a 
children’s court may order that legal representation be provided at state expense for a 
child involved in proceedings under the Act, if it is in the child's best interest.
110  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
proving beyond reasonable doubt that a child indeed has come full capacity rests on the prosecution in any 
given case. The prosecution must not only prove that the child was able to distinguish between right and wrong, 
but also that the child knew that the act was wrongful at the time and in the circumstances in which it was done. 
The prosecution must further show that the child was capable of controlling his or her conduct in accordance 
with such knowledge and appreciation. (See Sloth-Nielsen ‘Child Justice and Law Reform’ in Davel Introduction 
to Child Law in South Africa 393 et seq.)  The Bill repeals the common law with regard to children below the age 
of 14 years. The minimum age of criminal capacity is raised from seven to 10 years. The rebuttable presumption 
of doli incapax with regard to children who are at least 10 but not 14 years of age is codified. The Bill provides 
that  
a child who, at the time of the commission of an alleged offence is below the age of 10 years, cannot be 
prosecuted; and  
  a child who, at the time of the commission of an alleged offence, is at least 10 years, but not yet 14 years of age 
is presumed not to have had the capacity to appreciate the difference between right and wrong and act 
accordingly, but this presumption may be rebutted if it is subsequently proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
he or she did have capacity at that time.   
 
  The Bill contains elaborate provisions regarding the duties of the police (inter alia to notify the parents of the 
child) but provides specifically that with regard to serious offences listed in a schedule to the Bill, a police official 
may not release a child. What will be permissible under these circumstances, though, is that if a place of safety 
or a secure care facility is available within a reasonable distance from the place where a preliminary enquiry will 
be held, the child must be detained there in preference to detention in a police cell. This measure is aimed 
specifically at a concern voiced by some of the commentaries the Law Commission received with regard to 
combating the high crime rate.  
110 This provision unfortunately, has not yet been put into operation. S 8A(1) provides specifically that a child is 
entitled to legal representation at any stage of the legal proceedings. S 8 A(2) requires of the court to inform a 
child who is capable of understanding, at the commencement of any proceedings, of his or her right to legal 
representation. See, however, n 85 supra, for a discussion of s 6 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, which provides 
that a court may appoint a legal practitioner to represent a child of the marriage at the divorce proceedings of its 
parents.  
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No indication is given what will constitute substantial injustice. It is suggested, therefore, 
that all relevant factors and circumstances would have to be taken into account. It is 
also not clear what the court's role should be in ensuring the contents of this right of 
children. Should the court, for example, allow a child to refuse legal representation if this 
would result in substantial injustice? There are no clear answers to these questions but 
authors submit that the court should at least ensure that a child in legal proceedings, 
whether criminal or civil, must have been informed of his or her right to legal 
representation.  
28(1) Every child has the right –  
(i) not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in times of armed 
conflict.  
 
The aim of this subsection is to prevent the recruitment of children into armed forces in 
time of armed conflict and a direct participation of such children in hostilities. It is to be 
noted that the age limit of 18 years is in excess of international minimum standards, 
which in certain instances envisage the recruitment of children older than 15 years into 
armed forces.
111
 Section 3(1)(b) of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 determines that the 
minimum age for recruitment into the South African National Defence Force is 17 years. 
This provision might therefore be in conflict with section 28(h)(i) of the Constitution.  
Bekink & Brand submit that is not clear from the wording of this subsection with the 
children are also protected against being used indirectly in armed conflict. They 
suggest, however, that the phrase ‘[a]nd to be protected in times of armed conflict’ 
would seem to suggest that even such indirect participation would endanger the lives of 
children and would be constitutionally inappropriate. Nevertheless, this phrase makes it 
clear that there is an obligation on the State to act positively in this regard. The extent of 
such protection would be measured against what is reasonable and justifiable  
111 Bekink & Brand (n 26) 193. Art 38(2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) provides  
that states parties to the Convention shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have 
notattained the age of 15 years do not take a direct part in hostilities. See too De Waal et al (n1) 194.  
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to require from the state in a modern society based on the values of human dignity, 
freedom and equality.
112  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112  ibid. The inclusion of this subsection must be viewed against the background of South African youths heavily 
involved in armed conflict during the struggle against apartheid. In this regard a brief history of the participation 
of youths in conflict is appropriate.  South Africa's recent history is the proverbial tale of two cities, of two people, 
of two countries.  In fact, South Africa's treatment and handling of conflicts in the past was fundamentally 
determined by skin colour. Black children were the direct victims of the apartheid regime due to their 
involvement in the politics of liberation. As such, they operated freely and without the regulatory role of the 
State, and in many cases of the family itself. The price paid for this involvement was a high degree of 
repression, oppression and alienation. White children on the other hand, experienced a rather protected and 
secure environment.  Under the umbrella of the State and institutions of socialisation such as the church, these 
children grew up driven by the need to defend the nation from an eminent communist attack. (See Nina Children 
involved in South Africa’s Wars: After Soweto 1976 Published Monograph No 37: Child Soldiers in Southern 
Africa, April 1999 and the sources referred to there.)  The struggle for political freedom created a particular 
identity for the children of South Africa who participated in the uprising and resistance from 1976. Young black 
activist became protagonists in a political struggle which forced them into early adulthood. In fact, many children 
lost their humanity and the capacity to be children after Soweto 1976. The youth has been at the forefront of 
struggles since the late 1970s but especially since the mid-1980s. With the call for ‘people’s war’ and the 
development of ‘structures of people's power’, youth have created barricades, destroyed the homes of 
councillors and the councillors themselves, run so-called ‘people's courts’ and ‘manufactured’ arms to fight the 
security forces.  However, they also suffered the consequences. The historical role that the children of South 
African adopted since Soweto 1976, created an identity of resistance, activism and of leadership. In fact, the 
identity that emerged justified their protagonist role.  Moreover, it justified the levels of violence adopted and 
used against all ‘legitimate targets’. The strength of the children/ young people was so powerful that they 
succeeded in questioning the apparent unchallengeable authority of the State in the late 1970s, and led the 
process for the ‘ungovernability’ of the townships in the early 1980s. These politico-military achievements were 
to be taken seriously. They shaped the identity of children as one of legitimate fighters or warriors that created 
the popular culture that justified the role of children in the struggle. To fight against apartheid was the right thing 
to do, no matter what a personal consequences the child needed to endure. The psychological and social 
damage done by the involvement of children in the struggle, indeed is of a most serious nature.  Children have 
been exposed to violence in many different ways in the country. Stress, trauma, anxiety and depression are 
obvious sequela to many of the acute or chronic situations which children had to face. However, a further 
inevitable effect has been that many children or youths have been drawn into an acceptance of ‘a culture of 
violence’ as a natural part of daily living and a natural part of the solution to conflict and differences. Apartheid 
managed to create a culture of brutalisation and repression over children.  In fact, since Soweto 1976, State 
security forces concentrated their energy on repressing children and young people who were considered to be 
one of the main groups responsible for the lack of stability in the country. Repression and the logical resistance 
to it, and also the levels of militancy, transformed the psychology of these children and affected the normal 
process of socialisation. Children and young people became a clear target for the apartheid regime and their 
normal processes of social regulation were distorted. (The level of brutalisation and repression was so alarming 
that the New York based Committee for Human Rights defined the apartheid state as one conducting acts of 
‘terrorism’ and engaged in a real ‘war against children’. Official figures show that in the 1984-1986 township 
uprisings, 300 children were killed by police, 1000 were wounded, 11 000 were detained and 173 000 were held 
in police cells awaiting trial. Factional fighting in townships and police brutality killed more than 14 000 thousand 
people in the decade stretching from 1984-1994.  
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5  CONCLUSION  
South Africa has experienced enormous political and social change in the last decade. 
Apartheid has been deposed and democracy has been embraced. There is an 
increasing recognition of the importance and value of fundamental rights entrenched in 
both the Constitution and international instruments. Sections 233 of the Constitution 
which provides that a court must prefer an interpretation of legislation that is consistent 
with international law, and 39 which requires international law to be considered when 
interpreting the Bill certainly bear out on this recognition.  Section 39(1)(a) reads that a 
court must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom when interpreting the Bill. In the process of such 
interpretation the court must in terms of section 39(1)(b) consider international law. It is 
submitted that in the case of children’s rights contained in the Constitution, these 
subsections compel a reading of constitutional provisions in conjunction with provisions 
of the Convention. This would be the case especially where provisions of the 
Convention are substantively relevant (ie human rights law). Along this line of argument 
one can conclude that the basic values that link the genesis of rights and their justifiable 
limitations, also create an interpretative circle between the Convention and the 
Constitution. Such interaction between the Convention and the Constitution 
simultaneously asserts the supremacy of the Constitution and provides a persuasive 
normative force for the Convention qua international human rights law.  
       The ‘normalisation’ of violence and the socialisation through violence have implications also for the Constitution 
and consolidation of the nation in a post-apartheid society. Violence has come to be expected. The perception 
that the use of force and violence is the only means of resolving conflict is commonplace. This reflects, and 
results, in a desensitisation to violence and the loss of respect for human life. See Nina, supra.  
